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REGULATING THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION: PRIVATE
ACCREDITATION AND A NEW SYSTEM ETHOS
BARRY R. FuRRow*
"[T]he notion that some sort of automatic, self-regulating marketlike
structure can be established that will substitute for public management
and yet achieve public objectives is a fantasy: powdered unicorn horn. 'q
I. INTRODUCTION
A MERICA spends considerably more per capita on health care than do
1 Xother industrialized countries. 2 The good news is that the rate of
growth of health expenditures continues to drop. 3 In 1996, national
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; Director, the Health
Law Institute; and Dean of Faculty. A.B. 1967, Harvard College;J.D. 1971, Harvard
Law School.
1. Robert Evans, Going for the Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Market-
Based Health Care Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 427, 462 (1997).
2. See id. at 451-52. ("[A] large proportion of the difference in per capita
expenditures between the United States and all other countries of the [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development] was a result of higher relative
prices of health care in the United States."); see also GeorgeJ. Annas & Frances H.
Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and Ecomonics Affect Informed Consent in the
U.S., the UK. and Japan, 20 AM.J.L. & MED. 357, 377 (1994) (stating that "[lit is not
a coincidence that the U.S., which treats health care as a market good, spends far
more money on the health sector than does any other country in the world" and
that "[t]hree years ago, the U.S. spent 131 percent more per capita on health care
than did Japan, and almost 200 percent more than did the U.K."); Sylvia F. Klein-
man & John Glasel, The Clinton Health Plan: We Deserved Better, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 241, 241 (1994-1995) ("As a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and on a per capita basis, America's health costs greatly exceed those of other
nations."); Dana Priest, The Road to Health Care Reform, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at
12 (stating that "the United States spends more per capita on health care than any
other country"); Stephen Zuckerman & Jade Hadley, Clinton's Cost Controls Can
Work, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at C7 (noting that United States spent 14.3% of
GDP on health care in 1993, although no other industrialized nation spent more
than 10%).
3. See Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition: Care, Cost, and Cover-
age, 22J. HEALTH POL. POL'v & L. 339, 350 (1997) (stating that most major surveys
in employee benefit context have concluded that growth in total spending per
employee has slowed substantially and that "[t]he broadest examination of health
care expenditures ... results reveal a ... downward trend in health care spending
over the past couple of years"); see also Katherine R. Levit et al., Health Care Spend-
ing in 1994: Slowest in Decades, 15 HEALTH AFF. 130, 130-33 (1996) (noting slow rate
growth of health expenditures); Charles D. Weller, The Next Generation After PSOS:
Self-Insured Patient Choice Organizations for Medicare, 9 HEALTH L. 21, 24 (1997) (not-
ing decline in rate of growth of health care costs since 1990 and that health care
increases were "slowest in decades").
(361)
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health expenditures increased only 4.4%, the slowest growth since 1960. 4
The growth rate between 1993 and 1996 averaged five percent, in contrast
to the 11.7% average growth between 1966 and 1993.5
As private employers, states and the federal government have lowered
the rate of increase in health care costs, managed care continues to
reshape the practice of medicine in the United States. 6 Managed care
organizations (MCOs) have provided the basic framework for American
health care delivery because of their success in slowing health care cost
inflation.7 Managed care has achieved this slowdown by extracting a dis-
count from physicians, who often reduced their fees from forty percent to
seventy percent to be part of managed care networks, and by reducing
hospitalization rates and lengths of stay. 8 State Medicaid agencies are con-
verting to managed care, with capitated plans accounting for up to seventy
percent of the market. Medicare is also moving toward managed care. 9
Managed care is rapidly supplanting fee-for-service (FFS) medicine all
over the country. 10 Physician practices, group practices, hospitals, other
health care organizations and now insurers are consolidating by combin-
ing into systems."1 Some systems are integrated, with salaried physicians
and their own hospitals, while others engage in extensive contractual ar-
4. Katherine R. Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends in 1996, 17 HEALTH
Arr. 35, 36 (1998) (stating that growth rate was lowest in four decades).
5. See id. (citing statistics from Health Care Financing Administration, Office
of Actuary, National Health Statistics Group).
6. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethink-
ing Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 421 (1997) (discussing more comprehensively low-
ered rate of increase and noting significant role played by managed care
organizations (MCOs)).
7. See Timothy N. Troy, Does Managed Care Work?, 6 MANAGED HEALTHCARE 21,
25 (1996) (discussing effectiveness to date of MCOs in retarding growth of health
care costs). In 1994, national health care costs rose just 6.4%, in contrast to an
average increase in health care costs of 14.6% per year from 1980 to 1985 and
12.6% from 1985 to 1990. See id.
8. See id. (discussing methods by which managed care has reduced rate of
growth in health care costs).
9. Bruce E. Landon et al., Quality Management by State Medicaid Agencies Con-
verting to Managed Care, 279 JAMA 211, 211 (1998) (discussing movement of gov-
ernment agencies toward managed care); Joseph White, Which 'Managed Care' For
Medicare?, 16 HEALTH AlT. 73, 79-80 (1997) (noting Medicare's movement towards
managed care and analyzing various managed care options available for
Medicare).
10. SeeJohn K Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Managed Care, 327
NEw ENG. J. MED. 742, 74247 (1992) (discussing potential benefits of managed
care). The escalation in medical spending by both the Medicare program and
private health insurers led to an intensified focus on managing health care costs.
See Furrow, supra note 6, at 422 & n.4 (discussing Medicare move to managed
care). Traditional fee-for-service (FFS) insurance that pays medical charges with-
out question has declined sharply over the past few years. See id. (noting that only
22% of people covered for health benefits by Aetna Life and Casualty in 1990 were
eligible for traditional care as opposed to 64% in 1988).
11. See Furrow, supra note 6, at 422 & n.4 (discussing trend toward consolida-
tion and resulting medical provider systems).
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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rangements to achieve integration. 12 Medical groups are also consolidat-
ing into physician practice management organizations. 13 Nearly eighty-
five percent of insured working Americans now receive coverage through
a managed care plan, such as a health maintenance organization (HMO),
a preferred provider organization (PPO) or a point-of-service plan. 14
The history and theory of managed care promise cost-effective quality
services to large populations. 15 Yet, managed care also creates risks for
patients as a rapidly expanding market leads organizations to employ per-
nicious strategies to compete for subscribers. Consumers fear that they will
receive substandard care, be denied access to needed specialists and the
best hospitals and end up worse off as a result of managed care economiz-
ing.' 6 Some of this consumer anxiety is grounded in legitimate fears of
12. See id. (discussing types of consolidated systems); Michael A. Morrisey et
al., Managed Care and Physician/Hospital Integration, 15 HEALTH AFF. 62, 65 (1996)
(discussing integration, but noting that such integration should not be overstated,
because current evidence demonstrates that many such integrated delivery systems
are relatively simple physician-hospital organizations and less than 25% of all hos-
pitals have developed such systems).
13. SeeJames C. Robinson, Consolidation of Medical Groups into Physician Practice
Management Organizations, 279 JAMA 144, 144-49 (1998) (discussing trend); Wil-
liam S. Painter, New Trends in Medical Practice Compensation Transitioning from "Eat
What You Kill", SB51 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 633, 670 (1997) (discussing consolidation
trend). One commentator noted that
[w] hether as the result of the. impact of managed care or because physi-
cians recognize the need to be able to access larger amounts of capital
and develop stronger management teams, there is a significant trend to-
ward medical practice consolidation. Often, the consolidating organiza-
tion may be a hospital system, but increasingly independent physician
medical groups are combining to form larger, single specialty and multi-
specialty organizations.
Id.
14. See Ron Winslow, Health-Care Inflation Kept in Check Last Year, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 20, 1998, at BI ("[T]he annual Mercer-Foster Higgens survey [of 1997], a
widely followed barometer of employer health costs... found that 85% of Ameri-
can workers with health insurance now belong to some kind of managed-care plan,
up from 52% in just four years."); see also Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of
Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, 16 HEALTH AFF. 125, 125 (1997) (not-
ing that 75% of American employers in both small and large firms alike receive
health care coverage through managed care plan).
15. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse
Quality of Care, 16 HEALTH AF. 7, 18 (1997) (discussing goal of managed care).
16. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAK-
DOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST 9-32 (1996) (discussing disadvantages of managed care
and setting forth number of examples of bad health maintenance organization
(HMO) care). This book obviously represents a backlash against what the public
fears is the predatory cost-cutting strategies of such organizations. For a critique of
the book, see RobertJ. Samuelson, Book Review, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at 13.
For a study of access to care in HMOs as compared with traditional insurance
plans, see Tami Mark & Curt Mueller, Access to Care in HMOs and Traditional Insur-
ance Plans, 15 HEALTH Are. 81, 86 (1996). Mark and Mueller concluded that
HMOs and traditional plans offer a trade-off between financial and administrative
barriers. See id. (comparing HMOs with traditional plans). HMO enrollees were
more likely than their counterparts in traditional plans to have had a medical visit,
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excessive cost-cutting by market-driven plans. Some of the anxiety is based
on a typically American desire to get all health care that is marginally ben-
eficial, whatever the cost, so long as somebody else absorbs it.
Managed care begins with an assumption that only cost-effective care
should be given, to minimize the total resources consumed by health care
expenditures for the employer, employee or citizen receiving government
financed care. Some of the critique of managed care is derived from this
misalignment of perspective. Some subscribers will indeed be harmed at
the margins by denial of care that in hindsight would have been effective
despite its small probability of success when viewed over a large popula-
tion. 17 The goal is to reduce this level of harm to the smallest level possi-
ble. The level of patient harm is likely to decrease as managed care
reduces use of diagnostic tests, drug prescriptions, use of specialists and
particularly hospitalization. Reduction of intensive medical interventions
reduces the risks of injury from the side effects of medical treatment.1 8
We must also worry, however, about the risks of underutilization in man-
aged care, as well as problems of adverse selection, access and treatment of
the poor.
MCOs-a hybrid of insurance, cost control mechanisms and medical
delivery-can make decisions that harm patients. 19 Patients can be
harmed by limits on access to specialty care, limits on access to hospitaliza-
tion, poor drug choices and delayed diagnosis. 20 Given the variation in
MCOs and their quality assurance activities, consumer protection con-
straints are needed just as in any market system with many players with
economic power. The aggressive promotion of quality should be the pri-
mary goal of MCOs.
Managed care is an important development in the American health
care system, with the potential to rationalize the delivery of care in ways
and they had more medical visits and shorter waits in their provider's office. See id.
at 81-87. They were more likely, however, to report having unmet health care
needs. See id.
17. Some marginally useful care must be foregone to reduce health care
costs. See Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice
Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418, 418-21 (1990) (comparing gatekeeper physicians with
rationing of health care); David M. Eddy, What Care Is "Essential"? What Services are
"Basic"?, 265 JAMA 782, 782-86 (1991) (discussing problems in determining what
is or is not essential care); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-
Containment Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220,
224 (1987) (arguing for rationing with "cutting back on care that has lowest ex-
pected value"); William B. Schwartz & Paul L. Joskow, Medical Efficacy Versus Eco-
nomic Efficiency: A Conflict in Values, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1462 (1978)
(discussing loss of additional care in cost-cutting efforts of managed care).
18. See P. Franks et al., Sounding Board: GatekeepingRevisited-ProtectingPatients
from Overtreatment, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 424, 426 (1992) (discussing merits of
protecting patients from risks of overtreatment).
19. See ANDERS, supra note 16, at 226-43 (discussing disadvantages of managed
care).
20. See id. (illustrating HMO horror stories).
364 [Vol. 43: p. 361
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that FFS medicine coupled with indemnity insurance could not.2 1 Can
market competition between large MCOs eliminate the worst excesses of
the system by forcing MCOs to compete on the basis of quality? At pres-
ent, cost competition drives the marketing of these organizations to em-
ployers and large groups.2 2 The question posed by this Article is whether
private accreditation can force competition among competing plans on
quality criteria, influencing both corporate purchasers of health care and
consumers to choose based on quality.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the principles of man-
aged care and how these principles affect the efforts to reduce costs and to
improve outcomes.23 Part III discusses the current state of managed care
and some of the major issues facing the managed care industry including
reduction in physician's income and autonomy, the lack of conclusive evi-
dence as to the benefits and risks involved in managed care, the struggle
to define managerial power within MCOs and poor integration of ser-
vice. 24 Part IV suggests some strategies for quality regulation in managed
care. 25 Part V reviews the merits of the National Committee on Quality
Assurance (NCQA).26 Finally, Part VI concludes with some thoughts on
the evolution of MCOs. 2 7
21. See Barry R. Furrow, Incentivising Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Hap-
pens to Professionalism, 1 WIDENER L. Symp.J. 1, 3 (1996) (noting that MCOs claim to
provide less expensive care without sacrificing quality); see also HAROLD S. LuFT,
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 386-406
(1981) (discussing both known and unknown qualities of HMOs); PAUL T. MEN-
ZEL, MEDICAL COSTS, MORAL CHOICES: A PHILOSOPHY OF HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS
IN AMERICA 14448 (1983) (approving of managed care model as ethical based on
availability of choice and implied consent); Clark C. Havighurst, Health Mainte-
nance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
716, 718-24 (1970) (discussing managed care generally); Willard G. Manning et al.,
A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1505, 1505 (1984) (discussing results and concluding that style of
medicine in prepaid group practices is much less "hospital-intensive" and less
expensive).
22. Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1806 (1992). Even
Havighurst, long a forceful advocate of the merits of market competition in health
care delivery, is less than sanguine about its benefits in the present market. See id.
He writes about "interconnected practical, legal, and cultural obstacles to private
choice." Id.
23. For a discussion of the principles of managed care, see infra notes 28-61
and accompanying text. This author has altered his structure somewhat, but por-
tions of Part II are abstracted from a previous article. See Furrow, supra note 6, at
419.
24. For a discussion of the current state of managed care, see infra notes 62-
148 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of strategies for quality regulation in managed care, see
infra notes 149-205 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the merits of NCQA private accreditation, see infra
notes 206-36 and accompanying text.
27. For the conclusion of this Article, see infra notes 237-38 and accompany-
ing text.
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Transfer of Financial Risk
Security of Coverage
The principles of managed care and integrated systems date back to
the previous century.28 The modern model of managed care is derived
from five fundamental principles: (1) a focus on wellness and prevention;
(2) a drive for "appropriate" treatments, meaning the most cost-effective
care; (3) integration of services; (4) transfer of financial risk from insurer
to provider to the greatest extent possible; and (5) security of access to
health care for the consumer-employee at a fixed price. 29
In the 1800s, businesses such as railroads, sugar plantations and lum-
bering companies wanted to attract immigrant labor and retain it, often in
isolated locations in an undeveloped United States.3 0 The provision of
health services was an important way of attracting new labor and reducing
labor turnover. Throughout the 1800s, various immigrant groups and
their employers pioneered capitated health care and organized delivery of
services.3 1 Three of the major organizing principles that underpin man-
aged care were visible early: (1) security to the employee that all necessary
care would be provided so long as the employment status continued;32 (2)
financial risk-bearing by employers and providers, through salary as the
mode of payment instead of FFS;3 3 and (3) a focus on prevention or well-
28. See Emily Friedman, Capitation, Integration and Managed Care, 257 JAMA
957, 957 (1996) ("The roots of managed care, capitation, and integration can be
traced to the funeral and benevolent societies that immigrants set up to cover
death expenses in the 1800s.").
29. See, e.g., Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1989)(en banc) ("People are concerned both about the cost and the unpredictability of
medical expenses. [An HMO plan] would allow a person to fix the cost of physi-
cians' services."). Thus, even the courts have acknowledged the comfort provided
by coverage of all health expenses during a fixed period provided by the managed
care coverage.
30. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 957 (describing beginnings of managed
care systems).
31. See id. (stating view that these arrangements were designed to "recruit[]
people to work in isolated areas, such as sugar and pineapple plantations in Ha-
waii; lumber camps in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Washington State; mines on the
iron ranges of northern Minnesota; and railroads just about anywhere").
32. See id. at 958 (noting examples). One commentator noted that
[m]ine owners in Lehigh, Pa., provided physician and hospital services to
employees for 75 cents a month. The Northern Pacific Benevolent Associ-
ation, formed in 1882 in Minnesota, owned five hospitals and several clin-
ics and employed dozens of physicians from Minnesota to Washington
State; it provided services to railroad employees until the mid 1960s.
Id.
33. See id. (noting as example that "[i]n 1914, Henry Ford founded his 'poor
man's hospital' . . . by acquiring the financially troubled... Detroit (Mich.) Gen-
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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ness in many of the programs, as part of business goals of maintaining a
healthy workforce and as a way of reducing the costs of chronic illnesses to
the plan.34
The use of capitation by the modern MCO, and its focus on cost-effec-
tive treatment, has a more modern derivation in the HMO movement of
the 1970s. During this period, the Medicare and Medicaid programs were
facing rapidly growing costs, while critics noted that American health care
was badly maldistributed, limiting access by the poor and rural residents,
and was inefficiently administered and inferior in many of its delivery com-
ponents. 35 The country was perceived to face a national crisis in health
care in 1970, driven by escalating costs of FFS medicine.3 6 The theory that
the financing system should reward health maintenance through prepay-
ment for comprehensive care became popular. 37 As both federal and
state governments incorporated this strategy into their health care poli-
cies, HMO enrollment began to increase more rapidly, with the number of
HMO plans growing from 175 in 1976 to more than 650 in 1987.38
The term "managed care" now encompasses a continuum of plans-
ranging from plans that require little more than preauthorization of pa-
tient hospitalization to staff model HMOs-that focus on utilization and
eral Hospital... [which,] when it opened in 1915.... was dedicated to then new
concept of a 'full-time' staff of physicians.., a salaried medical staff to pursue the
hospital's research and teaching missions as well as patient care").
34. See id. at 957-58 (noting as example that "Oliver Mining Co. in north cen-
tral Minnesota (later U.S. Steel) provided extensive visiting nurse services to keep
workers and their families healthy and out of the hospital").
35. See id. at 958 (discussing problems associated with health care delivery).
36. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 381
(1982) ("The 1970s opened with ominous declarations of a crisis in health care.").
37. See id. at 395 (discussing origins of comprehensive care). The Nixon ad-
ministrators from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare consulted
with Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., a Minnesota physician, founder of Interstudy, and advo-
cate of the restructuring of financial incentives in the private medical sector. See
id. at 396 (summarizing Ellwood's health maintenance proposal). Because Ell-
wood's health maintenance strategy was viewed as self-regulating-not needing a
new federal bureaucracy to manage it-it appealed to a Republican administration
hostile to big government. See id. at 395-96 (discussing proposal's popularity with
Republicans). President Nixon adopted this HMO strategy as a cornerstone of his
new national health policy, as did then Governors Ronald Reagan and Nelson
Rockefeller for their states. See id. Congress passed the Health Maintenance Or-
ganization Act of 1973 ("1973 HMO Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-14a (1994),
which required employers to offer at least one qualifying HMO as an alternative to
conventional insurance in their health benefit plans, if a qualifying HMO was in
the vicinity. See STARR, supra note 37, at 395-96. The 1973 HMO Act unfortunately
created regulatory barriers to HMOs that hampered their growth. See id. at 405-15
(noting that law called for low subsidies and high requirements). By 1976, how-
ever, momentum toward HMO growth increased as Congress amended the law to
increase federal aid to HMOs. See id. at 415.
38. See Lynn R. Gruber et al., From Movement to Industry: The Growth of HMOs, 7
HEALTH AFF. 197, 199 (1988) ("Essentially the amendments liberalized require-
ments for federal qualification and created widespread industry acceptance of the
federal qualification distinction.").
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price of services.39 The dominant goal for an MCO has become the re-
duction of health care costs and maximization of value to both patient and
payer. 40 An MCO is a reimbursement framework combined with a health
care delivery system, an approach to the delivery of health care services
that contrasts with FFS medicine. 4 1 Managed care is usually distinguished
from traditional indemnity plans by the existence of a single entity respon-
sible for integrating and coordinating the financing and delivery of serv-
ices that were once scattered between providers and payers. 42 This entity
provides comprehensive health care services to an enrolled membership
for a fixed per capita fee, thus becoming both an insurer and a provider of
medical care. This risk-bearing is then distributed downstream to physi-
cian providers through capitation contracts. 43 MCOs have a contractual
obligation to provide care and must arrange for facilities and physicians to
give that care.
44
MCOs are governed by both state and federal law.45 Federal policy is
based on the assumption that MCOs deliver medical care at a total annual
39. See ROBERT G. SHOULDICE, INTRODUCTION TO MANAGED CARE: HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, PROFOUND PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPETI-
TrvE MEDICAL PLANS 2 (1991) (introducing concept of managed care and discuss-
ing various types of managed care plans); see also DONALD K. FREEBORN & CLYDE R.
POPE, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE IN MANAGED CARE: THE PREPAID GROUP PRACTICE
MODEL 5 (1994) (same).
40. See PETER D. Fox, OVERVIEW OF MANAGED CARE TRENDS, THE INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE: A LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL RoADMAP 1 (1990) (discuss-
ing goal of managed care and growth, evaluation and possible side effects of man-
aged care).
41. See id.
42. See SHOULDICE, supra note 40, at 13 ("The HMO concept combines a fi-
nancing mechanism and a delivery system under the control and direction of a
single management entity."); Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a
Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 76 (1993) (discussing differences between managed
care plans and traditional health insurance).
43. The prevalence of capitation as a mode of payment may be somewhat
overstated in the literature. Most hospital and physician contracts with HMOs use
discounts, fee caps and per diems rather than capitation. See Allen L. Hillman et
al., Contractual Arrangements Between HMOs and Primary Care Physicians: Three-Tiered
HMOs and Risk Pools, 30 MED. CARE 136, 139 (1992) (discussing various allocations
of risk depending on managerial organization of HMO).
44. See FREEBORN & POPE, supra note 40, at 53 (discussing contractual duties of
HMOs). In the words of Freeborn and Pope:
HMOs have a contractual responsibility to provide or arrange for the fa-
cilities and physicians through which their members receive care. When
people join an HMO, they are notjust buying health insurance. They are
buying access to a health care system and have a contractual right to med-
ically necessary services.
Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(c) (1994) (regulating blood supply for treatment of
hemophilia). States are rapidly producing regulations that govern both financial
solvency and quality concerns for MCOs. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1551-
1567 (West 1992) (discussing 1973 HMO Act and its purpose "to permit and en-
courage the formation and regulation of health maintenance organizations").
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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cost per person substantially lower than non-MCO health care plans. 46
Early studies found that MCOs cost from ten percent to forty percent less
than FFS plans, 47 admitted patients to hospitals forty percent less often
than do fee for service plans, 48 and used forty percent fewer hospital
days.49 Costs of outpatient care are typically cut in half when a patient
sees a primary care physician first.50 Differences in utilization of discre-
tionary surgery by MCO and non-MCO plans have been particularly large
because surgery under MCO care is less frequent, thereby lowering overall
program costs.5 ' MCOs thus provide real cost savings, attributable in part
to the incentives created by per capita fixed fees to keep within an annual
budget.52 Despite uncertainity about the cost savings over the long run,
MCOs are now an essential tool for employers concerned about health
care costs, and they have become a cornerstone of federal policy for the
Medicare and Medicaid systems. 53
Integration of services has become a major goal of those who study
the American health care system. Truly integrated care has enormous po-
tential both to reduce costs and to improve outcomes. One example is the
treatment of asthma. In the past decade, the ideal pattern of care for a
child with asthma has changed dramatically.. The modern approach
places devices and treatments in the home that were available only in an
emergency room ten years ago.54 A parent of a child with asthma today
can, with training, perform simple pulmonary-function tests, administer
46. See Troy, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing HMO's success in delivering
health care at reduced per capita expense).
47. See LuvT, supra note 21, at 74 (discussing early studies concluding that
HMOs enable lower costs); Manning et al., supra note 21, at 1507 (same).
48. See Manning et al., supra note 21, at 1507 (discussing fact that HMOs have
lower rate of hospital admittance than do FFS plans).
49. See GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AM., HMO INDUSTRY PROFILE: UTILIZATION
PATTERNS 1 (1988) (detailing study of HMO utilization patterns complied with
data of contributing insurance plans); Manning et al., supra note 21, at 1507 (dis-
cussing findings).
50. See Christopher B. Forrest & Barbara Starfield, The Effect of First-Contact
Care with Primary Care Clinicians on Ambulatory Health Care Expenditures, 43 J. FAM.
PRAc. 40, 40 (1996) (attributing cost savings to lower payments for primary care
physician services, less resource-intensive practice styles of generalists compared
with specialists, lower severity of illness and lower reimbursement for established
rather than new patients).
51. See Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, Can Managed Care Plans Control
Health Care Costs?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 196, 196 (1996) (noting that managed care
plans have succeeded in their primary mission to slow growth of health care costs).
52. See id.
53. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994) (superceding state law, establishing comprehensive
regulatory authority over employee welfare and pension benefit plans and ex-
tending authority to include plans that provide medical, surgical or hospital care
benefits to plan participants).
54. See Gary R. Fleisher, Management of Asthma, 8 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE
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therapy with a nebulizer and adjust types and doses of medication-all
without leaving home. Better outcomes are the result.55
This new, modern pattern of asthma care is difficult to establish in a
fragmented cottage industry with fragmented reimbursement. The doctor
may be paid for visits, the pharmacist for filling prescriptions and the hos-
pital for emergency room services. Few health plans, however, teach a
mother to measure peak expiratory flow at home, visit the house to look
for offending allergens or deliver and set up the nebulizer machine. Few
incentives exist to design this new pattern of care, to craft contracts with
companies supplying the home nebulizers or to develop programs to train
patients in self-care. Managing asthma properly today requires a shift in
thinking from selling separate services to designing and managing a sys-
tem of integrated care.
Aggregating payment for all the care of a defined population makes
integration and innovation both easier and more cost-effective. Resources
can be transferred among providers of care so that the costs of an innova-
tion such as home outreach for asthma patients can be offset by gains in
reduced visits or hospital use. Capitation, properly designed, can clarify
areas of interdependence and encourage cooperation, thereby improving
the quality of care.
A second example is an integrated treatment approach for chroni-
cally ill elderly patients. 56 HMOs could implement both effective preven-
tion and comprehensive rehabilitiation as a systematic approach to
managing common geriatric symptoms. 5 7 Longer visits between patient
and doctor could promote continuity of care and compliance with treat-
ments, reducing system costs while improving outcomes. 58
The organization paid by capitation must be able to redesign its care
system for capitation to be an effective incentive. Providing capitated pay-
55. FAMILY MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE 403 (Robert B. Taylor ed.,
Springer-Verlag 1988) (noting that episode of asthma will often respond to "home
or outpatient treatment with a beta agonist given orally with a nebulizer").
56. See Nicole Lurie et al., The Effects of Capitation on Health and Functional
Status of the Medicaid Elderly: A Randomized Trial, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 506,
506 (1994) (concluding that there is no evidence of harmful effects of enrolling
elderly patients in prepaid plans).
57. James R. Webster, Jr. & Joseph Feinglass, Stroke Patients, "Managed Care,"
and Distributive Justice, 278 JAMA 161, 162 (1997) (noting that because HMOs are
comprised of integrated teams of health professionals that can be targeted toward
defined populations of chronically ill elderly patients, "HMOs are ideally posi-
tioned to institute systematic approaches to managing common geriatric
syndromes").
58. See Linda J. Weiss & Jan Blustein, Faithful Patients: The Effect of Long-Term
Physician-Patient Relationships on the Costs and Use of HealthCare by Older Americans, 86
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1742, 1746 (1996) (concluding that longer duration of tie
between physicians and patient was "associated with substantially lower costs of
inpatient and outpatient care and with a lower risk of hospitalizations"); see also
Sheldon Greenfield et al., Expanding Patient Involvement in Care: Effects on Patient
Outcomes, 102 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 520, 526 (1985) (finding that patients who
regularly interacted with physicians reported improvement in functional ability).
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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ment to too small an entity, such as an individual physician, is not produc-
tive. The individual physicians lack the leverage or capability to change
the system and have little choice but to spend less within the current sys-
tem. Few doctors working alone could patch together all the elements of
a thoroughly modern program of asthma care. At the other extreme, ap-
plying capitation to too large an entity would also be a mistake. On a
sufficiently large scale, performance becomes too loosely connected to re-
wards, and change becomes too difficult and bureaucratic.
One solution might be scorecards that hold systems accountable for
their covered populations. These scorecards would include financial, ac-
cess, quality and outcome criteria. Community-wide health status meas-
ures such as infant mortality, preventable mortality and morbidity,
immunization rates and population-based measures of health and well-be-
ing could be included.5 9
The problem with such an integrated approach is that market success
in the managed care market is at present only loosely connected to quality.
Plans with poor reputations continue to grow; employer demands for
fewer plans covering broader markets increase market pressures that favor
size over past performance. This pressure to grow is motivated more by
the desire to exert market power than the ability to provide quality care or
to invest in internal systems. Studies have concluded that intensified com-
petition has created a need for workable quality of care measures. 60 Such
information is a necessary precondition to a strong link between market
success and a reputation for quality patient care. Private accreditation
through the NCQA and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations (JCAHO) is a powerful force promoting systematic
study of medical outcomes and transmission of this information to the
consumer. Such accreditation also helps to resist the pressure of consoli-
dating markets and the temptations to cut corners inherent in this
consolidation. 61
59. See Stephen M. Shortell et al., The New World of Managed Care: Creating
Organized Delivery Systems, 15 HEALTH AlT. 46, 62 (1996) (noting that availability of
measures is limited, but that some progress has been made).
60. See Facts About the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(visited Mar. 10, 1996) <http://www.jcaho.org/aboutjc/mh_frm.htm> ("The mis-
sion of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations is to
improve the quality of care provided to the public through the provision of health-
care accreditation and related services that support performance improvement in
health care organizations."); see also WALTER A. ZELMAN, THE CHANGINcG HEALTH-
CARE MARKETPLACE 61 (1996) ("According to the Mathematica survey while utiliza-
tion and cost measures are invoked most frequently, significant percentages of
managed care plans (especially HMOs) are employing measures of quality (46%),
and consumer surveys (36%), as well as a variety of other measures.").
61. See Nancy M. Kane et al., Markets and Plan Performance: Private Summary
Report on Case Studies of IPA and Network HMOs (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://
www.cmwf.org/health_care/konerpt.html> (noting that competitive pressure on
HMOs is function of drive to control larger market segment and is not related to
internal system requirement).
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF MANAGED CARE: CRIMP
Capitation
Reduction in Physician Income and Autonomy
Inconclusive Evidence as to Benefits and Risks
Managerial Power
Poor Integration of Services
MCOs are most commonly represented by HMOs, which include
group models, network models and independent practice associations
(IPAs). 62 Other organizations include PPOs, exclusive provider organiza-
tions, utilization review organizations and even hospitals.63 While a staff
model HMO will have a central location for practice, other models involve
physicians and dentists in their own offices, providing care to subscribers
under contract to the MCO.
64
The models do not have great conceptual value in evaluating quality,
because most plans now engage in multiple kinds of contracting arrange-
ments. Commentators have noted that "even within a 'pure' HMO model,
financial and clinical management arrangements and performance can
vary so greatly that results that show an average of highly variable arrange-
ments and performance may have little value." 65 Therefore, it becomes
difficult to make facile comparisons of different forms of MCOs.
A. Capitation
Capitation is the engine that powers current managed care organiza-
tional practice. 6 6 Because the risk is shifted from insurers to providers,
62. See Gary Scott Davis, Introduction to Managed Health Care Primer, in THE
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE: A LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ROADMAP 1 (1990)
(discussing variations in managed care throughout United States).
63. See generally Randall S. Brown & Jerrold Hill, DoEs MODEL TYPE PLAY A
ROLE IN THE EXTENT OF HMO EFFECTIVENESS IN CONTROLLING THE UTILIZATION OF
SERVICES? (1993). Although MCOs vary substantially in their structure, there is
little evidence at present that different structures make a significant difference in
the utilization of health care services. See generally id.
64. See Jay M. Howard, The Aftermath of HMO Insolvency: Considerations for Prov-
iders, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 87, 90 (1995). HMOs are usually classified into four
categories based on their relationship with medical care providers: staff model
HMOs that directly employ physicians to provide medical care; group model
HMOs that contract with an independent, multi-specialty corporation or partner-
ship of physicians to delivery care; network HMOs that contract with a number of
groups of physicians who also may serve patients not belonging to the HMO; and
in the individual practice association model, the IPA and HMOs that contract and
the IPA, in turn, contracts with individual physicians to provide care in their own
offices. See id.
65. Miller & Luft, supra note 15, at 19.
66. See Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation:
Keeping Your Head in Changing Times, 276JAMA 1025, 1025 (1996) (noting that in
metropolitan areas with high HMO enrollment, capitation is method of paying
primary care physician for 63% of enrollees). In general terms, "[c]apitation
means payment 'by the head."' Id. Under a capitation system, primary care physi-
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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insurers are not exposed to the same kinds of financial risks they were with
FFS medicine. 67 A capitated reimbursement scheme has three features:
"defined services for a specified time period are provided through an
agreed-on prepayment; payment is tied to the care of a particular patient;
and the provider, in accepting the capitation, agrees to be at risk for costs
exceeding the capitation amount."68 Approximately six percent of the
U.S. population is now in a fully capitated plan for all services.69 Within
HMOs, capitation is the leading form of physician reimbursement, with
cians are paid a set fee per month for each enrollee who has selected that physi-
cian as their primary care physician. If the primary care physician's cost for the
month (for treating enrollees) is less that the capitation amount, the balance is
kept by the physician as profit. If, however, the physician's monthly cost for treat-
ing enrollees exceeds the capitation amount, the HMO pays no additional fees and
the loss is born by the primary care physician. Because the HMO is not required to
pay any additional fees under a system of capitation, the burden of risk is effec-
tively shifted from the insurer to the health care provider. The realignment of
objective, by participating health care providers under a system of capitation fos-
ters a collaborative approach to patient care, rather than an adversarial approach.
See id. at 1028-30 (explaining advantages of cooperative risk-sharing in capitation);
Peter Boland, The Power and Potential of Capitation, MANAGED CARE Q., Winter 1997,
at 1, 4 (noting that capitation, through risk shifting, facilitates redefining of busi-
ness relationships and financial incentives among participants). This collaborative
approach advances one of the goals of capitation, namely, to provide better care to
more people at less cost. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra, at 1026 (discussing
benefit of system in which cost is uniform); Maurice Penner, How HMOs Assess
Medical Groups and IPAs, MANAGED CARE Q., Spring 1997, at 1, 1 (noting that before
capitating physican organization, HMOs make evaluation to ensure that physician
organization is capable of managing risk while maintaining high level of member
satisfaction).
67. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 66, at 1026 (noting that shift of
risk from insurer to providers means insurers have little to fear from members
getting sick); Anthony F. Lehman, Capitation Payment and Mental Health Care: A
Review of the Opportunities and Risks, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNrTY PSYCHIATRY 31, 32
(1987) (noting that capitation requires health care provider to bear risk that pa-
tient "will require more services than capitation revenues will cover").
68. David Mechanic, Strategies for Integrating Public Mental Health Services, 42
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 797, 798 (1991); see Steven S. Sharfstein, Prospec-
tive Cost Allocations for the Chronic Schizophrenic Patient, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 395,
397 (proposing medical cost allocation system under which capitation rates would
be based on health status or risk). Capitation rates for individuals presenting high-
risk (individuals who may require a significant amount of services) must necessarily
focus on the patient's past use of services, current health status and disability. See
id. (noting that high-risk patients require more frequent and more intensive treat-
ment). Such mechanisms often assume the exclusion of high-risk individuals. See
id. (noting that most health care organizations operating under system of capita-
tion "function by removing as many high-risk patients as possible from the pool of
covered lives... enrolling as many healthy people as possible ... to offset the high
costs of the high-risk patients"); see also Lehman, supra note 67, at 32 (noting that
persons with chronic illnesses may be excluded from plans funded by capitation
system because of resistance by health care providers to utilize expensive health
services needed for treatment of chronic illnesses).
69. See Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal Implications of Using Capitation to
Affect Physician Decision Making Processes, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'V 391,
392 n.3 (1997) (evaluating liability created by capitation).
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approximately fifty-five percent of HMOs using this form of payment. 70
By the year 2005, more than fifty percent of the population will be in capi-
tated health plans.
7 1
In capitated managed care physician groups, mandates in their pro-
vider contracts control the management of risks and promotion of quality
assurance.7 2 Quality assurance activities to date have focused on overuse
of medical care; this focus reflects managed care's obsession with cost con-
tainment and preventive services.73 Little attention has been paid to qual-
ity issues in chronic disease care and to negative effects of underuse of
care.74 The latter issues are the subject of much criticism of HMOs at
present and are the focus of much private accreditation activity by NCQA.
The IPA model is now the most common HMO model. 75 Physicians
in IPA group together to contract with managed care plans. 76 The plans
then make capitated payments to the IPA as a group for all physician and
related professional services for enrolled patients, in advance of the provi-
sion of services. The IPA then pays the individual physician members, as-
suming responsibility for managing costs and quality of care provided by
participating physicians. The payments may not be set at a level to com-
pensate for the care actually provided during the capitation period, and
therein lies the financial risk. Around sixty percent of the 550 HMOs now
in operation use this model.77
70. See id.
71. See Julie Johnson & Mike Mitka, Managed Care Maelstrom, 37 AM. MED.
NEws 1, 1-2 (1994) (following trends in health care organizations).
72. See Eve A. Kerr et al., Quality Assurance in Capitated Physician Groups: Where
Is the Emphasis?, 276 JAMA 1236, 1236 (1996) (noting that groups under capita-
tion, as part of constraints, assume fiscal responsibility as well as responsibility for
quality assurance).
73. See id. at 1238 (noting that most capitated physician groups focus quality
assurance programs on overuse rather than underuse). The concentration of
quality assurance assets on overuse of services may reflect an effort to ensure the
economic viability of the particular physician group. Alternatively, the concentra-
tion of assets may reflect the realities of monitoring services. It may simply be
more efficient to monitor services that have been provided rather than to monitor
services that should have been provided.
74. See id. (noting that lack of monitoring for quality assurance in treatment
of chronic disease may be reflection of sufficient data systems and monitoring
tools).
75. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 66, at 1026 (noting that IPA
model of HMO is most common capitation arrangement in United States repre-
senting 59% of HMO models by mid-1994).
76. See id. (noting that in IPA model, independent physicians from different
office practices join together in affiliation for purposes of contracting with man-
aged care plans); Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients At Risk: Health Reform and Risk Ad-
justment, 13 HEALTH AnF. 132, 132, 134-35, 139-40, 142 (1994) (discussing results of
study showing that HMOs were able to enroll healthier members while avoiding
high costs associated with last few months of life, suggesting that health plans can
effectively estimate risk which should facilitate capitation rates that are adjustable
based on enrollee's expected cost).
77. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 66, at 1026.
[Vol. 43: p. 361
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/2
1998] REGULATING THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION 375
The primary risk in a pure capitation model is that physicians may
have to spend time with their patients for no additional compensation,
depending upon the frequency of patient visits and the size of the capita-
tion payments. A capitation-plus-bonus model, prevalent in HMOs, adds a
level of risk by setting aside some percentage of a physician's income in
risk pools. Such risk pools or "withhelds" cover specialist referrals and
ancillary services such as radiology and laboratory services. If year-end
costs in these pools are less than the amount set aside, then the physicians
get bonus payments. 78
IPAs may track each physician's referral and testing costs, or may pay
each member of the group the same bonus based on the group's perform-
ance. The group approach weakens direct pressure for an individual phy-
sician to cut corners on referrals, but peer pressure is stronger toward a
more conservative style of practice. Other IPAs blend the two into a com-
plex formula. Some IPAs add a bonus based on quality of care, based on
chart review and patient satisfaction surveys. 79 Risk-adjusted capitation is
also developing to properly distribute risks among physicians with differ-
ent mixes of patients. Rates can be set differently based on age and health
status. Capitation has become a "high-risk, high-stakes proposition in the
context of a fearsomely competitive, market-oriented health care
system." 80
Capitation might affect the quality of care in two basic ways: by influ-
encing individual decisions, especially on the part of physicians, and by
encouraging systemic integration and innovation in the design and deliv-
ery of services. Both advocates and opponents of capitation reserve most
of their energy for the first of these themes: the effect of capitation on the
choices made by individual physicians. Decades of health services re-
search have established that doctors vary widely in their use of diagnostic
tests, drugs, therapeutic procedures, hospital admissions and surgery.
Though scores for the appropriateness of care do not always correlate well
with rates of procedures, many observers believe that the excessive use of
unhelpful treatments is more common than the withholding of effective
78. See id. at 1027. Bodenheimer and Grumbach have noted that
[u]nder some managed care arrangements, the base capitation payments
may be sufficient only to cover a physician's office overhead; the physi-
cian's take-home income may completely depend on the bonus payments
he or she receives. In the current marketplace, payers and HMOS are
driving down capitation payments, thereby increasing the importance of
bonus payments. The greater the degree to which earnings are deter-
mined by these risk-sharing arrangements, the more intense the pressure
to restrict patient access to expensive specialty and diagnostic services.
Id.
79. See id. For high cost patients, stop-loss insurance coverage is available
from commercial carriers, or through self-insurance in large physician groups. See
id. at 1028.
80. Id. at 1030.
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ones.8 1 Capitation at this level functions as a source of pressure for a re-
flexive second look by a physician. It creates pressure on physicians to
think twice before ordering a test or treatment because they bear some
financial risk for the costs of their own choices.
8 2
Capitation best alters individual decisions through the intermediate
filters of group process, consensus among peers and clinical-policy formu-
lation. In this sense, capitation should be used not as a pure alternative to
rules, but rather as a way to cause "soft rules" to take shape at the practice
level. The aim would be not to cause an individual doctor to consider the
interactions between decision and profit in the case of a particular deci-
sion for a particular patient, but rather to induce physicians in group prac-
tices to consider the costs and benefits of clinical-management patterns
for patients of a general type in the long run.
Although the influence of capitation on doctors' decisions has at-
tracted most of the controversy, a second view of capitation-that it can
favorably influence the design of the health care delivery system-may be
more important for improving the quality of care. Fragmentation of
health care delivery is a major problem in our system because health care
developed through professional and organizational categories that empha-
sized functional specialization. Capitation may create positive pressures
toward integration.
B. Reduction in Physician Income and Autonomy
The current struggle of physicians and groups to adapt to capitation
has created stresses on physician incomes. Practitioners may experience
severe financial difficulties because of miscalculations in negotiating a
capitated contract. Every issue of Medical Economics discusses strategies for
negotiating contracts to help physicians avoid pitfalls. 8 3 These contracts
have also become a legal specialty, as lawyers representing physician cli-
ents struggle to master the intricacies of actuarial data as part of negotiat-
ing capitation agreements. 8 4 Physicians in some specialties have seen
81. See, e.g., id. at 1025 (noting that purpose of capitation is to slow rising costs
of health care by reducing excessive amounts of unnecessary medical service).
82. If these incentives are coupled with MCO feedback to physicians about
current health services research, practice patterns may shift to a more appropriate
level of practice. If a physician or physician group, however, develops a reputation
for providing high quality care for the sickest patients, this reputation "will attract
new higher-cost enrollees that bring with them only average (flat) premium pay-
ments, which is a recipe for bankruptcy or at least a financially weakened organiza-
tion." Miller & Luft, supra note 15, at 7, 20.
83. See, e.g., Woodrow H. McDonald, The Big Gamble Capitation Forces On You:
Managed Care Plans and Family Physicians, MED. ECON., June 27, 1994, at 47, 48
(noting that before agreeing to capitation rates, health care providers should in-
quire as to how plan will be marketed and to whom it will be marketed and recom-
mend higher capitation rates based on serving higher-risk populations).
84. See generally Judy Capko, Get Ready for the Changes That Capitation Will Bring;
Capitation Payments by Managed Care Health Services Providers, 38 AM. MED. NEws 22
(1995); Alex Gramling, Managed Care Needn't Come Between You and Your Patients,
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their incomes drop, although others have gained.8 5 Most physicians, how-
ever, feel unhappy with the changes in their work environment, sense that
others are managing them and feel that their clinical autonomy is slipping
away.86 As the managed care market matures and MCOs devise newer and
less intrusive ways of achieving a cost-effective practice environment, these
pressures are likely to abate. A new generation of physicians, accustomed
to a salaried or capitated managed care environment, will also find the
advantages of the managed care environment more to their liking.
C. Inconclusive Evidence as to Benefits and Risks
The central issue for policymakers is whether managed care can lower
total resource consumption (not just hospital consumption) while improv-
ing quality. 87 The studies to date have found similar or better outcomes in
some populations for some procedures, while others concluded that some
ill elderly HMO enrollees had worse quality-of-care outcomes than their
FFS counterparts. 88
Critics fear that MCOs, which increasingly operate within a capitated
reimbursement system, create incentives to underutilize services because
the cost of providing such services is absorbed within a fixed budget.8 9
Some studies have found that MCOs have succeeded in maintaining qual-
MED. ECON., Feb. 1995, at 62, 63-65 (discussing various techniques used by some
health care providers to retain control over health services delivery in facilities
operated by HMO); Deborah S. Kolb & Judith L. Horowitz, Managing Transition to
Capitation, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Feb. 1995, at 64, 64 (advising health care prov-
iders to begin implementing programs to ease eventual shift from FFS to a capita-
tion payment system); Jim Montague, Old Traditions, New Realities; Dealing with New
Health Care Delivery Systems, 68 HosP. & HEALTH NETWORmS 22, 22 (1994) (noting
that complete transformation in delivery of health care had led to "declining in-
comes and mounting regulations").
85. ZELMAN, supra note 60, at 225 ("As for ... financial incentives-withholds,
bonuses, and so on-research by the Mathematica Group found these to be mod-
est, with physicians facing maximum income fluctuation ... of 'generally 20 per-
cent or less.'").
86. See Peter B. Jurgeleit, Physician Employment Under Managed Care: Toward a
Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated Physicians, 73 IND. L.J. 255, 255
(1997) (noting that physician's discretion over medical decisions and professional
autonomy generally has been supplanted by institutional pressures from HMOs).
87. Miller & Luft, supra note 15, at 18 (discussing results of survey on resource
use in managed care).
88. For a further discussion of studies addressing resource consumption by
MCOs, see Furrow, supra note 6, at 465-69.
89. See Andreas Schneider & JoAnne Stem, Health Maintenance Organizations
and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U. L. Rv. 90, 98-99 (1975) (noting that
capitation creates economic incentives to exclude individuals who are likely to util-
ize services at high rate); Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance
Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1674, 1676 (1994) ("Despite the political and economic momentum to-
ward managed care as a means to prevent overtreatment and conserve costs, little
empirical evidence exists to show how well this system protects patients against
undertreatment.").
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ity while reducing cost.90 Managed care consumes fewer resources, such
as use of specialists or intensive care units in hospitals, without evidence of
increases in patient morbidity or mortality. 91 Some of these differences
may be caused by patient factors, such as the relative youth of managed
care subscribers. 92 Another explanation might be the practice style of
physicians in managed care, who have learned a more conservative style of
treatment.93 As managed care plans, particularly Medicare HMOs, cover
more and more older and potentially sicker populations, costs may in-
90. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-2, ARIZONA MEDICAID:
COMPETITION AMONG MANAGED CARE PLANs LowERS PROGRAM COSTS, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2 (1995)
(reviewing Arizona's successful state-wide Medicaid program and discussing Ari-
zona's high level of beneficiary access to appropriate care and its techniques for
controlling cost and reducing capitation rates). Arizona's state-wide Medicaid pro-
gram has been successful in containing costs, saving the federal government $37
million and the state $15 million in acute care costs during 1991. See id. Addition-
ally, Arizona was able to reduce capitation reimbursement rates by 11% in 1994.
See id. "Arizona's program succeeded in containing costs by developing a competi-
tive Medicaid health care market. Health plans that submit capitation rates higher
than their competitors' bids risk not winning Medicaid contracts." Id. Moreover,
the emphasis on cost control has not come at the expense of member access be-
cause Arizona's Medicaid program specifies standards that must be met by health
care providers and gives more weight to factors such as access and quality than are
given to capitation reimbursement rates. See id.; Nicole Lurie et al., Does Capitation
Affect the Health of the Chronically Mentally Ill?, 267JAMA 3300, 3304 (1992) (evaluat-
ing Medicaid managed care plan enrolling people with serious mental illness and
concluding that "this first randomized trial of prepaid care for [chronic mentally
ill] Medicaid beneficiaries did not find consistent evidence of short-term adverse
health effects in prepaid plan enrollees"); Bentson H. McFarland, Health Mainte-
nance Organizations and Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 30 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 221, 236 (1994) (reviewing research literature on treatment by HMO of
people with severe mental illness and concluding that setting realistic reimburse-
ment rates was critical factor in determining whether patients received adequate
treatment from health care providers utilizing capitated payment system).
91. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980, 271 JAMA 1512, 1518 (1994) (reviewing studies conducted since 1980 com-
paring managed care with indemnity plans and concluding that "HMO plans ex-
hibit significantly lower utilization of hospital services"). A review of studies
conducted since 1980 comparing managed care with indemnity plans found that,
in 18 of 20 comparisons from nine different studies, HMO plans used 22% fewer
procedures, tests or treatments that were considered expensive or had cheaper
alternatives. See id. at 1515.
92. See Derek C. Angus et al., The Effect of Managed Care on ICU Length of Stay:
Implications for Medicare, 276 JAMA 1075, 1081 (1996) (concluding that, although
managed care plans overall appear to offer lower cost health care than traditional
FFS medicine, no cost savings were apparent in intensive care management of
older and sicker patients). Angus noted that "[o]ne must wonder whether man-
aged care organizations will be able to continue offering health care coverage at
lower cost than traditional insurance programs and managed care case mix
changes to include sicker and older patients." Id.
93. See Philip F. Cooper et al., Patient Choice of Physician: Do Health Insurance
and Physician Characteristics Matter, 33 INQUIRY 237, 244 (1996) ("[M]embers of
health maintenance organizations used specialists significantly less than those with
other types of insurance.").
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crease for HMOs and HMOs may be tempted to cut back too far on refer-
rals. 94 The evidence, however, does not yet support this concern.
Well-managed MCOs provide substantial benefits to subscribers.
HMOS are more effective at providing preventive care and health-promo-
tion services than traditional indemnity plans.95 HMO patients are more
likely to have screening for breast cancer, high blood pressure, cervical
cancer and colon cancer than FFS patients. 96 Treatment provided during
these services was also found to be as good as or better than that offered by
FFS physicians.9 7 Female HMO enrollees receive more mammographies,
clinical breast exams and pap tests than those with FFS coverage.9 8 Addi-
tionally, for certain treatments, studies have shown no significant differ-
ence in patient outcomes whether the patient is treated in a prepaid
group practice or by a traditional FFS medicine. 99
94. See Angus et al., supra note 92, at 1081 (noting that as mix of cases shift to
include sicker and older patients, MCOs will not be able to continue offering lower
cost health coverage).
95. See Miller & Luft, supra note 91, at 1516 (analyzing managed care per-
formance since 1980 and noting that HMO plan enrollees receive more preventive
tests, procedures, examinations and health-promotion services than indemnity
plan enrollees).
96. See I. Steven Udvarhelyi et al., Comparison of the Quality of Ambulatory Care
for Fee-for-Service and Prepaid Patients, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 394, 398 (1991)
(noting that results of study found that for treatment of uncomplicated hyperten-
sion and provision of preventative services to middle-aged women without chronic
diseases, HMO enrollees received equal or better quality care than FFS patients).
97. See id. (noting that HMO patients receiving common ambulatory care re-
ceived same or better service than FFS patients).
98. See DIANE M. MAKuC ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE AND CANCER SCREENING
AMONG WOMEN, (Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics of the Ctrs. for
Disease Control and Prevention, Nat. Ctr. for Health Stat. No. 254, 1994) (review-
ing "national data on the relationship between type of health insurance coverage
and recent use of mammography, clinical breast examinations... and Pap tests by
women 40 years of age and over"). The commentators found that among women
aged 50 to 64 with 12 years of education or less, 63% of female HMO enrollees had
received a mammogram within the year preceding this study, compared with only
48.1% of women with FFS coverage. See id. at 4. Almost 71% of the total HMO
enrollees had recently received a clinical breast examination and nearly 65% had
received a Pap test within the past year. See id. By contrast, less than 64% of wo-
men with FFS coverage had received a clinical breast exam in the past year, and
only 56% had received a Pap test in the past year. See id. For women 65 and older,
use of mammography and Pap testing was approximately 13% higher for HMO
enrollees than for women with FFS coverage. See id. at 5.
99. Sheldon Greenfield et al., Outcomes of Patients with Hypertension and Non-
Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus Treated by Different Systems and Specialties: Results
from the Medical Outcomes Study, 274JAMA 1436, 1436 (1995) (finding no meaning-
ful difference in health outcomes for patients with hypertension or non-insulin-
dependant diabetes mellitus whether treated by prepaid group practices or tradi-
tional FFS medicine); Sheldon M. Retchin et al., Outcomes of Stroke Patients in Medi-
care Fee for Service and Managed Care, 278 JAMA 119, 119 (1997) (noting that,
although stroke patients in HMOs are more likely to be discharged into nursing
homes than stroke patients of traditional FFS medicine who go to rehabilitation
facilities, survival patterns for comparable patients in both systems are similar);
Edward H. Yelin et al., Health Care Utilization and Outcomes Among Persons with Rheu-
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Studies of cancer screening have also concluded that providers diag-
nosed HMO enrollees with melanoma, cervix, colon and female breast
cancer at earlier stages in the disease, with melanoma and cervical cancer
detected significantly earlier. Even with cancers that lack such routine
screening procedures, studies have concluded that the level of diagnosis
between HMOs and FFS are the same.
Care of the elderly is often mentioned by critics as being vulnerable to
cost-cutting incentives in MCOs. 10 0 One recent study concluded that eld-
erly patients enrolled in prepaid plans reported better general health and
well-being scores than those enrolled in FFS plans. 10 1 No differences were
discovered between the two groups, however, as to number of deaths, the
proportion in fair or poor health, physical functioning, activities of daily
living, visual acuity, blood pressure or diabetic control.10 2 Another study
found that elderly patients with hypertension enrolled in HMOs were
likely to have their blood pressures checked regularly, to have their histo-
ries documented, to be referred to ophthalmologists for examination and
to have cardiac examinations. 10 3 A third study, however, found that eld-
matoid Arthritis in Fee-for-Service and Prepaid Group Practice Settings, 276 JAMA 1048,
1052 (1996) (finding no major difference between outcomes with FFS or prepaid
group practice settings for patients receiving treatment for rheumatoid arthritis).
But see Andrew M. Kramer et al., Outcomes and Costs After Hip Fractures and Stroke: A
Comparison of Rehabilitation Settings, 277JAMA 396, 396 (1997) (finding that stroke
patients admitted to rehabilitation facilities had greater functional recovery and
were more likely to return to community than comparable stroke patients admit-
ted to nursing homes). Seventy-five percent of stroke patients entering rehabilita-
tion facilities returned to the community within six months after admission. See id.
at 400 tbl.2. In contrast, only 20% of comparably functioning stroke patients who
entered traditional nursing homes returned to the community within six months.
Id. The commentators note however that results after three months were almost
identical to the six-month results. Id. Accordingly, the commentators note that
"with few exceptions, patients returned home within the first 3 months or not at
all." Id.
100. See Lurie et al., supra note 56, at 506 ("Under prepayment, physicians
may respond to economic incentives by seeing chronically ill patients less often.").
101. See id. at 509 tbl.3 (summarizing and comparing baseline health status
measures for HMO and FFS patients). The commentators reported a 0.4 differen-
tial in the general health index (range of 4 to 12) in favor of HMO patients. See id.
Likewise, HMO patients had better well-being scores (range of 3 to 12) by an aver-
age of 0.3. See id.
102. See id. at 508 (summarizing and comparing specific indicators of health
and physical dependency for HMO and FFS patients).
103. SeeJeanette A. Preston & Sheldon M. Retchin, The Management of Geriatric
Hypertension in Health Maintenance Organizations, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICs Soc'y 683,
687-89 (1991) (discussing results of study and concluding that elderly hyperten-
sives receive equal or better care from HMOs than from FFS setting); cf. Sheldon
M. Retchin & Barbara Brown, Elderly Patients with Congestive Heart Failure Under Pre-
paid Care, 90 Am. J. MED. 236, 236 (1991) (concluding that elderly HMO patients
with congestive heart failure receive care that is at least equal to quality of care
received in FFS settings); Sheldon M. Retchin & Barbara Brown, Management of
Colorectal Cancer in Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations, 5 J. GEN. INTRNAL
MED. 110, 110 (1990) (concluding that elderly HMO patients with colorectal can-
cer receive care that is equal to quality of care received in FFS settings). But see
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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erly, poor, chronically ill patients experienced worse physical health out-
comes in HMOs than in FFS systems while average patients did not.
10 4
The authors of the study suggested that, although HMOs seem to do well
with younger patients, subgroups such as Medicare beneficiaries and the
poor were more than twice as likely to decline in health in an HMO com-
pared to a FFS plan. 10 5
Children are also vulnerable to deficiencies in health care. Early
comparative studies of HMOs and FFS concluded that children receive
equal or better care in HMO settings. 10 6 More recent studies, however,
have expressed a fear that, even under risk-adjusted capitation systems,
children with chronic health problems such as asthma and diabetes may
remain at risk for discrimination in a competitive health care market.
10 7
As the number of patients within a capitated group becomes smaller, the
risk of selection bias increases because plans will try to avoid high cost
patients.1 0 8 Without some way to adjust payments to physicians for such
risks, MCOs will be tempted to either dump patients or select healthier
H.S. Luft, HMOs and the Quality of Care, 25 INQUIRY 147, 147 (1988) (finding that
low income patients in Medicare HMOs receive deficient care for certain chronic
medical conditions, including hypertension); Thomas A. Heller et al., Quality of
Ambulatory Care of the Elderly: An Analysis of Five Conditions, 32 J. Am. GERIATRICS
Soc'y 782, 782 (1984) (same).
104. SeeJohn E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly
and Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems: Results from
the Medical Outcomes Study, 276 JAMA 1039, 1039 (1996) (summarizing results of
study). The commentators concluded that
[e]lderly patients sampled from an HMO were more likely (than those
sampled from an FFS plan) to have a poor physical health outcome in all
3 sites studied. Second, patients in the poverty group and particularly
those most physically limited appear to be at a greater risk of decline in
health in an HMO than similar patients in an FFS plan.
Id. at 1045.
105. See id. at 1046 (cautioning policy makers against generalizing overall per-
formance of HMOs to specific subgroups such as Medicare patients or poor pa-
tients because younger and healthy patients inflate overall statistics).
106. See R. Burciaga Valdez et al., Prepaid Group Practice Effects on the Utilization
of Medical Services and Health Outcomes for Children: Results from a Controlled Trial, 83
PEDIATRICS 168, 179 (1989) ("Our results support the hypothesis that no serious
negative health effects exist for children receiving care in the staff model prepaid
group practice compared to those receiving fee-for-service care."). A sample of
693 children ranging in age from newborn to 13 were randomly assigned to either
a staff model HMO or to one of several FFS plans. See id. at 169. There were
virtually no differences between the groups in total health expenditures or in indi-
vidual health outcomes. See id. at 174-76. Children assigned to an HMO had a
40% greater number of routine preventive examinations and had a 50% greater
number of office visits than children assigned to a FFS plan. See id. at 175.
107. See Elizabeth J. Fowler & Gerard F. Anderson, Capitation Adjustment for
Pediatric Populations, 98 PEDIATRICS 10, 16 (1996) (finding that current risk adjust-
ment models are unable to effectively predict cost of providing medical care to
children with special needs and concluding that chronically ill children are at risk
in competitive health care market).
108. See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment for a Children's Capitation
Rate, 15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 39, 40 (1993) (noting that without risk adjustment,
21
Furrow: Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 361
ones. 10 9 Risk adjustment measures are available to minimize such selec-
tion bias and are likely to provide a standard of care by which to measure
the performance of MCOs. 1 10
Acute care situations pose another troublesome area for comparison.
Yet the studies have found that HMOs provide better care in such situa-
tions than FFS plans. A 1994 study concluded that patients with acute
appendicitis with only FFS coverage were more likely to suffer a ruptured
appendix, which is associated with elevated mortality, than those patients
enrolled in HMO plans.11 1 Another recent study found no difference be-
tween managed care plans and FFS or Medicare plans as to length of stay
("LOS") in a hospital for elderly patients, after adjusting for severity of
illness.11
2
One study discovered that HMO patients are more likely to be admit-
ted to a hospital in some acute situations, such as acute chest pain, regard-
less of their risk level for acute myocardial infarction.11 3 A study of
HMOs would experience "windfall profits and losses" and that such windfalls have
greater impact on smaller HMOs because of "law of large numbers").
"Selection bias" refers to the financial incentive for managed care plans to
avoid enrolling patients with more serious illnesses. See Fowler & Anderson, supra
note 107, at 10 (discussing situations in which HMOs attempt to avoid enrolling
high-risk patients); Newhouse et al., supra, at 40 (discussing incentive for HMOs to
avoid costly, chronically ill patients in absence of effective method to adjust capita-
tion payments based on risk).
109. See Newhouse, supra note 76, at 132, 133 (illustrating incentive for HMOs
to only enroll healthy patients if risk adjustment methods are not employed).
110. SeeJinnet B. Fowles et al., Taking Health Status into Account When Setting
Capitation Rates: A Comparison of Risk-Adjustment Methods, 276 JAMA 1316, 1319-20
(1996) (comparing performance of three risk adjustment strategies). These com-
mentators evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of three risk measures: self-re-
ported functional health status, self-reported chronic diseases and diagnosis
assigned by clinicians. See id. at 1317. Based on the results of the study, these
commentators recommended using a risk adjustment method'based on diagnostic
information when selection bias is suspected and such information is available. See
id. at 1316. If diagnostic data is not available, the authors recommended a system
based on either of the self-reported measures. See id. But cf. Fowler & Anderson,
supra note 107, at 10 (finding that significant underpayment for high-risk children
persists using current risk adjustment methods).
111. See Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk of Rup-
tured Appendix, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 444, 446 (1994) (reporting that ruptured
appendix occured in 29.3% of patients with acute appendicitis enrolled in FFS
plans compared to 25.8% for HMO patients with acute appendicitis). These com-
mentators acknowledged that a possible explanation for the increased risk of ap-
pendicidal rupture among FFS patients is that deductibles and higher copayments
may contribute to patient delay in seeking care. See id. at 448.
112. SeeAngus et al., supra note 92, at 1081 (commenting on results of study).
These commentators concluded that "[although] managed care plans appear to
be providing health care at lower cost in many arenas, cost savings in the ICU
management of older and sicker patients are not apparent at present." Id. at 1081.
113. See Steven D. Pearson et al., The Impact of Membership in a Health Mainte-
nance Organization on Hospital Admission Rates for Acute Chest Pain, 29 HEALTH SERVS.
RES. 59, 59 (1994) (reporting findings of study aimed at evaluating impact of staff
model HMO membership on hospital admission rates for patients entering emer-
382
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/2
1998] REGULATING THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION 383
clogged artery treatments done in 1988, however, found that HMO pa-
tients were 1.5 times more likely to undergo coronary bypass surgery or
angioplasty than Medicaid patients, although FFS patients were 2.3 times
more likely than HMO patients to have these procedures.11 4 Yet, mortal-
ity rates for HMO patients were slightly lower than those of FFS patients,
suggesting that a significant amount of coronary bypass surgery on FFS
patients was unnecessary and led to increased patient mortality and that
HMOs used such procedures more appropriately.' 15
Another study compared the treatment and mortality risk of prostate
cancer patients covered by FFS plans to such patients enrolled in
HMOs.' 16 The authors concluded that HMO patients were less likely to
receive surgery, but more likely to receive radiation therapy than patients
in FFS settings.' 17 Mortality risk was also lower for HMO patients than for
FFS patients, especially low-income patients.1 8 The authors concluded
that HMOs favored outpatient care, but did not undertreat their
patients. 119
gency department with acute chest pain). According to the authors, "[t]hese find-
ings suggest that organizational factors beyond financial incentives may exercise an
important influence on hospitalization rates for HMO patients." Id.
114. Kenneth M. Langa & ElliotJ. Sussman, The Effect of Cost-Containment Poli-
cies on Rates of Coronary Revascularization in California, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1784,
1787 tbl.2 (1993) (reporting odds of coronary revascularization for private FFS and
HMO patients as compared with Medicare patients). The study showed compara-
tively similar odds for coronary revascularization for FFS and HMO patients in
both 1983 and 1985. See id.
115. See id. at 1788 tbl.3 (reporting odds of inpatient mortality for private FFS
and HMO patients as compared with Medicare patients). The results for 1983 and
1985, however, showed a slightly greater risk of death caused by coronary revascu-
larization for HMO patients than for FFS patients. See id.
116. See Howard P. Greenwald & Curtis J. Henke, HMO Membership, Treatment,
and Mortality Risk Among Prostatic Cancer Patients, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1099, 1100
(1992) (summarizing objectives, methods, results and conclusions of study). The
study examined the treatment and survival rates of prostatic cancer patients in a
large, well-established HMO and in several FFS plans in the San Francisco-Sacra-
mento region. See id. The authors compared areas that directly pertain to the
quality of care: (1) stage of cancer at detection; (2) primary cancer treatment dur-
ing the six months following initial diagnosis; and (3) mortality risks. See id.
117. See id. at 1102 (discussing results of study). HMO patients also appeared
less likely to receive hormone therapy. Id.
118. See id. (discussing results of study). Acknowledging the possibility that
the subjects selected for the study may have differed in health status, health risks
and behavioral predispositions, the investigators included other key patient char-
acteristics in their analysis such as age and stage of cancer. See id. The relationship
between HMO membership and a lower risk of mortality remained statistically sig-
nificant even after those characteristics were held constant. See id. at 1102-03.
119. See id. at 1103 (asserting that finding HMO patients with prostatic cancer
less likely to receive surgery than FFS patients but more likely to receive radiation
therapy is "consistent with reports that HMOs favor outpatient care" and "[contra-
dictory to] the belief that HMOs undertreat their patients"). According to Green-
wald and Henke, the finding should encourage people to consider the HMO as a
desirable alternative to FFS plans, especially for low-income people. See id.
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Survival and mortality rates, the ultimate outcome measures for com-
paring delivery models of health care, appear to be the same or slightly
better in HMO patients when compared with FFS patients. HMO prefer-
ences for early detection and emphasis on prevention services has a strong
positive effect on the stage at which cancer can be detected, improved
survival and mortality rates.120 A study looking at health status outcomes
for elderly Medicaid recipients in FFS and in prepaid plans found
favorable survival rates for the managed care population, with no differ-
ence between prepaid and FFS groups in the number of deaths. 2 1
The evidence, therefore, supports claims that managed care has sub-
stantial advantages over FFS plans not only in controlling costs, but also in
maintaining or even improving the quality of care for subscribers. Man-
aged care also confronts potential weaknesses, including care for the
chronically ill, for children and for the elderly. Managed care systems vary
substantially in size, quality and organizational design. Some systems will
be poorly run, will use abusive marketing practices and will produce
poorer outcomes. Others will provide excellent care.
According to some commentators, the mixed results on managed
care quality suggest that "managed care and HMO capitation create incen-
tives to reengineer clinical processes, including integrating patient care
across services, locations, and time." 122 Favorable HMO quality-of-care re-
sults on "state of cancer" detection show that capitation-driven preventive
care can create an ideal situation in which earlier detection produces both
better consumer outcomes and lower treatment costs for HMOs. 123 These
same commentators, however, are not optimistic that change will come
rapidly. In their view, such change requires a critical combination of "phy-
sician leadership, physician organization, management expertise, and (to
some extent) capital that is beyond the present capability of many
(although not all) health plans and provider organizations. As a result,
quality of care is likely to continue to change slowly." 124 They lament the
primitive quality-reporting systems of most HMOs, as well as their crude
payment systems and fragmented clinical processes. They fail to acknowl-
edge, however, the possibility of an accelerating rate of change, driven in
part by the pressure of MCOs to get and retain their accreditation under
120. See Gerald F. Riley et al., Stage of Cancer at Diagnosis for Medicare HMO and
Fee-for-Service Enrollees, 84 AM.J. PuB. HEALTH 1598, 1600 (1994) (finding that HMO
enrollees were diagnosed at earlier stages than Medicare and FFS patients for fe-
male breast cancer, colon cancer, cervix cancer and melanomas and suggesting
that preventative screening services performed by HMOs contributed to earlier
detection).
121. See Lurie et al., supra note 56, at 506 (noting results of study conducted
to determine effect of health and functional status outcomes of medicaid recipi-
ents in prepaid compared with fee-for-service plans).
122. Miller & Luft, supra note 15, at 21.
123. See id. (discussing potential of HMOs to provide higher quality care at
lower cost because of ability to detect cancer at early stages).
124. See id.
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pressure from corporate purchasers. The NCQA andJCAHO will measure
more and more variables and publish and compare findings across plans.
The competition over quality rankings will intensify as the accreditation
process emphasizes such findings.
D. Managerial Power
Doctors and hospitals are increasingly combining into integrated de-
livery systems (IDSs). 125 Such systems are complex entities that include
group practices, MCOs and hospitals.' 26 Health care is now both deliv-
ered and managed through protocols of treatment, measurement of past
performance, incentive systems and new organizational structures. Health
care providers manage diseases through integrated approaches to drug
delivery and patient care. 127 MCOs now market quality care as just an-
other mode of competition. This marketing effort requires superior
knowledge regarding the level of care received by other subscribers. Fur-
ther, such organizations now routinely utilize physicians as employees
rather than as independent contractors, thus abandoning the traditional
hospital-physician employment model of independent contract. 128 More
than half of the nation's 640,000 doctors maintain some affiliation with
125. See BARRY R. FURROw ET AL., HEALTH LAW 226 (1995) (noting "explosive
growth" of integrated delivery systems); John K. Iglehard, Health Policy Report: Phy-
sicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED 1167, 1167 (1994)
(discussing growth in managed care systems).
126. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 125, at 225-26 (discussing players involved
in various integration arrangements).
127. See generally Kevin Lumsdon, Disease Management: The Heat and Headaches
over Retooling Patient Care Create Hard Labor, Hosp. HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 5, 1995,
at 34 (discussing emergence of "disease management" strategies that integrate phy-
sician care, drug delivery and patient monitoring through development of clinical
guidelines and advanced information systems).
128. See BRADFORD H. GRAv, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE
CHANGING ACCOUNTABILTY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 235-36 (1991). The funda-
mental principle of agency law is vicarious liability-the master (employer) is re-
sponsible for the torts of his servant (employee), committed while acting in the
scope of employment, even though the master was not negligent. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957) (stating rule regarding liability of master for
torts of servant); W. EDWARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 84 (discussing doctrine of vica-
rious liability). In the medical setting, physicians are usually treated as independ-
ent contractors rather than employees; the hospital is thus relieved of any agency-
based liability for their negligent acts. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 125, at 292-93
(discussing vicarious liability as applied to physician-hospital relationship as "in-
dependent contractor theory"). As the courts have considered the range of situa-
tions in which physicians provide care in the hospital setting, they have extended
agency principles to limit the independent contractor defense. See id. In the last
four decades, the courts have grappled with the independent doctor's connection
to health care institutions, using a number of doctrines to circumvent vicarious
liability limitations. See generally ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1988) (discussing various doctrines used by
courts to avoid limitations on vicarious liability in context of physician-hospital
relationship).
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MCOs, and the rate of affiliation is increasing geometrically as managed
care competition increases. 129
Management principles now pervade health care. Critics attack man-
aged care micromanagement of physicians as misguided, arguing with jus-
tification that physicians need substantial elbow room in their decision
making. °30 MCOs contend that they can provide less expensive care,
while maintaining the overall quality of care.' 3' Some groups fear this
evolution within the health care system. They worry that MCOs will limit
physician options. 13 2 They worry that MCOs will harm patients through
systematic cost-cutting. 133 They foresee "cookbook medicine" through im-
129. See Edward Felsenthal, Medical Plans Are Shouldering More Liability for Doc-
tors'Errors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at B8 (noting transformation in health care
system as to responsibility for delivery of care).
130. See David Frankford, Managing Medical Clinician's Work Through the Use of
Financial Incentives, 29 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 71, 84 (1994) (criticizing management
of physicians using incentive-based plans). Frankford argued that "[health care]
plans resting upon financial incentives to manage professional work conflict with
the values professionals espouse." Id.
131. SeeJames P. Murray et al., Ambulatoy Testing for Capitation and Fee-for-Ser-
vice Patients in the Same Practice Setting: Relationship to Outcomes, 30 MED. CARE 252,
252 (1992) (finding that "[hypertensive] patients with capitation health insurance
had fewer laboratory tests and lower overall charges than the fee-for-service pa-
tients, with no clinical or statistically significant differences in 1-year health out-
comes"); Barbara Starfield et al., Costs vs. Quality in Different Types of Primary Care
Settings, 272JAMA 1903, 1903 (1994) (studying relationship between efficiency in
use of resources and quality of care provided by physicians in state Medicaid pro-
gram). These commentators found a general lack of relationship between quality
and costs. See, e.g., id. at 1907 ("Facilities that provide services at lower costs can
achieve adequate quality as often as higher-cost facilities.").
132. See Henry Scovern, Hired Help: A Physician's Experiences in a For-Profit Staff-
Model HMO, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 787, 790 (1988) ("[T]he physician in a staff-
model HMO is located at the hinge of a V in which patients' needs are funneled
down one arm and administrative duties and constraints down the other.").
133. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Associa-
tion, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995) (expressing con-
cerns that managed care financial incentives make physicians more cost conscious
and may compromise patient care.) According to the Council on Ethical andJudi-
cial Affairs of the American Medical Association ("Council"), there are two ways
that financial incentives compromise the physician's duty of loyalty to the patient:
First, physicians have an incentive to cut corners in their patient care, by
temporizing too long, eschewing extra diagnostic tests, or refraining from
an expensive referraL. .. Second, even in the absence of actual patient
harm, the incentives may erode patient trust as patients wonder whether
they are receiving all necessary care or are being denied care because of
the physicians' pecuniary concerns.
... [F]inancial incentives to limit care exploit the financial motive of
physicians [and are] less likely . . . to coincide with patients' interests,
because patients generally prefer the risk of too much care to the risk of
too little care.
Id. at 333. The Council further noted that patients are less likely to notice the
effects of incentives, such as the withholding of a treatment option. See id. But cf.
Pearson, supra note 113, at 72 (stating that "the assumption that HMOs achieve
cost savings through a broad decrease in hospitalization rates must be closely ex-
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/2
1998] REGULATING THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION
posed practice guidelines,1 3 4 bureaucratic controls through utilization re-
view135 and dissipation of physician-patient trust as a result.13 6 They fear
that profound inequality within our health care system will result from any
rush towards efficiency-based medicine.1 37 Primarily, however, they fear a
corporatization of health care.1 38 They fear that under such corporatiza-
tion, doctors will come to resemble little more than production workers in
a medical version of the assembly line, with corporate management tools
and statistical process analysis micromanaging physician work.
An effective managed care system rests on three principles. First, phy-
sicians have primary responsibility for both cost control and quality im-
provement. Physicians act as a spigot in the health care system,
controlling enormous dollar expenditures. This flow of dollars into
amined" after study found higher admission rates for patients with chest pain who
were in HMOs than for those enrolled in other types of plans).
134. See Emily Friedman, Changing the System: Implications for Physicians, 269
JAMA 2437, 2442 (1993) (noting threats to physicians' clinical autonomy resulting
from managed care).
135. See Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed
Care Organizations, 23J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 223, 225 (1995) (discussing possible neg-
ative effects of utilization review in MCOs when not managed and implemented by
physicians). "Utilization review" refers to case-by-case evaluation of the necessity,
appropriateness and quality of medical care from the payer's perspective. See FUR-
ROW ET AL., supra note 125, at 321-22. It is a cost-containment strategy designed to
work by limiting the demand for health services. See id. at 322. One commentator
states that practice autonomy is usually lowest in staff model HMOs, in which utili-
zation review and other administrative responsibilities are normally controlled by
health plan administrators. See Christensen, supra, at 225. According to Christen-
sen, utilization review, when controlled by nonphysician administrators, can serve
as a barrier to patient care, contribute to increased job stress for physicians as they
try to get over administrative hurdles on their patients' behalf and cause a direct
conflict of interest between physicians' duty to provide quality care and their own
financial concerns. See id.
136. See Ezekiel Emanuel, Managed Competition and the Patient-Physician Rela-
tionship, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 879, 880-81 (1993) (discussing possible adverse ef-
fects of managed care on patient-physician relationship).
137. See BET=Y LEYERLE, THE PRIVATE REGULATION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
169 (1994) (criticizing America's "mechanistic approach" to health care for being
"not democratic at all"). According to Leyerle, the United States' "mechanistic"
health care system weighs most heavily on the people who are most ill-"the poor,
the very old, and the very young." Id. Leyerle asserts that a more sensible system
would be based on flexible, substantive, "cause-and-effect reasoning" in which
treatment decisions are made in response to the seriousness of a patient's condi-
tion and the likelihood of successful treatment. See id.
138. See id. at 7-8. (arguing that managed competition, as instituted by Ameri-
can corporate leaders, has already added to health care costs, deprived millions of
health care coverage, denied care to many of America's most ill citizens and cre-
ated a bureaucratic system of private regulation). Leyerle views managed care as
an industry-spawned development that increases "surveillance and control over
many parts of the health care delivery system." Id. at 9. In Leyerle's view, these
developments in health care are one example of the "encroachment of bureau-
cratic organization into almost every area of our lives. Bureaucracy, today, is the
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health care often diverts resources unproductively away from other social
needs. Any delivery system must provide methods for physicians to learn
about costs, effective treatments and limitations on available treatments.
Second, health care institutions, more than individual physicians,
have a responsibility to reduce the risks of accidents by aiming for a zero-
defect health care setting. Institutional care is often toxic to patients. Fail-
ures of institutions cause harm to patients; all too often patients are over-
dosed, infected in the hospital, suffer surgical accidents and even die from
medical accidents. 1 39 Physicians are one source of errors within a com-
plex technological enterprise, but overall systems design is very often the
real culprit.' 4
0
Third, bureaucratic structures are essential in managed health care to
control costs and manage risks. Bureaucracy can effectively address
problems of variation, medical errors and expensive medical practices.
Bureaucratic innovations should strive to control costs of medical treat-
ment, improve the quality of care delivered, protect the health status of
those receiving such care and improve social equity. 141 Bureaucracy's hi-
erarchical style, which imposes vertical controls, differs from medicine's
more informal collegial organization; yet both coexist successfully within
the hospital environment.142 Medical professionals maintain high educa-
tional standards and continually acquire knowledge and experience suffi-
cient to act independently.' 43 A bureaucracy, by contrast, functions
139. See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1855 (1994)
[hereinafter Leape, Error in Medicine] (discussing sources and types of medical er-
rors and error prevention methods); see also Lucian Leape et al., The Nature of Ad-
verse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324
NEw ENG.J. MED. 377, 377 (1991) (reporting study of patients hospitalized in New
York in 1984 that found that four percent of patients suffered injury that pro-
longed their hospital stay and caused measurable disability); E.M. Schimmel, The
Hazards of Hospitalization, 60 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 100, 101. (1964) (reporting
that 20% of patients admitted to one university hospital suffered injury resulting
from medical care received and that 20% of those injuries were serious or fatal); K.
Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a General Medical Service at a University Hospital, 304
NEW ENG. J. MED. 638, 638 (1981) (reporting that 36% of patients admitted to
medical service of university teaching hospital suffered injury resulting from medi-
cal care and that more than half of injuries were related to use of medication); D.
Gopher et al., Presentation at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Human Factors
Society (October 18, 1989) (reporting that one study of errors in medical intensive
care unit revealed average of 1.7 errors per day per patient).
140. Cf Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 139, at 1856 (recommending vari-
ous changes to health care delivery systems as primary means to discover and pre-
vent health care errors).
141. See generally Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the Quality
of Health Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7, 7-21 (1997) (discussing how quality assessment in
medical field can impact managed care and patient care overall).
142. See ODIN W. ANDERSON, HEALTH SERVICES AS A GROWTH ENTERPRISE IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1875, at 309 (1990) (describing hospitals as one of most
complex organizations possible, integrating hierarchical bureaucracy and informal
professional decision making under one roof).
143. See WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER
IN MEDICAL ETHICS 176 (1975) ("They have a direct grasp of first principles. This
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primarily through commands and sanctions, using financial incentives,
performance guidelines and other devices to channel employee behavior.
An MCO can coordinate and integrate its individual providers, using
its bureaucratic advantages to collect data, monitor its professionals and
alter behavior.
E. Poor Integration of Services
IDSs offer a range of benefits to enrolled populations by coordinating
hospital, physician and insurer activities; they accept the risk of providing
a range of benefits to the subscriber population for a fixed fee. By ac-
cepting such risk, these systems must demonstrate the quality and effec-
tiveness of the treatment they provide. As a result, hospitals seeking to
form IDSs have forged closer relationships with primary care physicians,
the gatekeepers in the new IDS. 14 Hospitals have also created manage-
ment relationships or even more integrated employment relationships
with these physicians. 145 Moreover, hospitals have sought to create effec-
tive specialist networks in an effort to seize control over ambulatory care-
a new line of business for hospitals-and to create partnerships with man-
aged care plans that would complete a truly integrated strategy.1 4 6
The physician's role within these health care delivery systems is rede-
fined. Physicians, accustomed to small group practices or solo practice,
will lack sufficient access to patients unless they belong to an integrated
system. This will result simply because the integrated systems, not the phy-
sicians, will ultimately control the delivery of care to plan patients.
Hospitals, MCOs and IDSs offer a starting point for reforms that link
cost and outcomes. These institutions can best promote good health care
outcomes within a system designed to direct physician service payments
towards them.147 Thus, organizations within which physicians practice
must recognize their central role in both cost controls and quality im-
provement. Consequently, MCOs and IDSs are thinking more frequently
about effective ways to link provider performance and institutional incen-
bestows upon them the mark of independence. The principle of collegiality ex-
presses this independence within a community of professionals; colleagues ideally
act in concert with one another chiefly by persuasion rather than command.").
144. See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Healthcare Reform: Managing
Care and Mangaging Risk, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 130 (1994) (discussing new inte-
grated relationships between hospitals and physicians); Stephen M. Shortell et al.,
Reinventing the American Hospital, 73 MILBANK Q. 131, 144-46 (1995) (same).
145. See Shortell et al., supra note 144, at 145 (noting existence of several
structured hospital-physician collaborative approaches, including physician hospi-
tal organizations, management service organizations and foundation, staff and eq-
uity models).
146. See id. (discussing hospitals' efforts to integrate services as part of systems-
based approach to health care provision).
147. See STEPHEN M. SHORTELL, STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR AMERICA'S HOSPITALS:
MANAGING CHANGE IN TuiRBuLENT TIMES 260-62 (1990) (advocating vertical organi-
zation in health care delivery, so hospitals are central focus of integrated contin-
uum of care).
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tives.148 With competition among IDSs, quality care marketing might be-
come as important as low-cost care marketing.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR QuALIrY REGULATION IN MANAGED CARE: CARP
Consumer Shopping
Adversarial Approaches
Regulation in the States
Private Accreditation
A. Consumer Shopping
Consumers and purchasers (including employers and government)
lack information on health plans or otn providers' access to care and qual-
ity of care performance.1 49 Little information is available that is truly com-
parable across organizations. One commentator noted that "[a]s a result,
consumers and purchasers cannot 'vote with their feet' and stimulate com-
petition among plans and providers on the basis of quality-of-care per-
formance, rather than simply on the basis of price."150 Such comparative
information is developing, however, as the accreditation process, state and
federal government, and the media all seek the ability to compare provid-
ers. Web sites are developing to allow consumers to access physician infor-
mation, comparisons of MCOs and hospitals, and practice guidelines and
treatment regulations. 5 1
148. See Mark C. Hombrook & Sylvester E. Berki, Practice Mode and Payment
Method: Effects on Use, Cost, Quality, and Access, 23 MED. CARE 484, 485-90 (1985)
(discussing and advocating use of "structure-conduct-performance paradigm").
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm is a model based on economic the-
ory and organizational behavior that sets out the crucial dimensions of these three
factors and describes their causal interrelationships and feedback effects. See id. at
485. The model can be used to hypothesize the structure of the health care mar-
ket and an MCO's objectives to influence the MCO's behaviors with regard to
products, promotions and strategy. See id. These behaviors are then hypothesized
to influence physicians' performance, including profitability, efficiency and effec-
tiveness. See id.
149. See John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers
Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 705, 707 (1997) ("[Con-
sumers] are and will remain technically unable to assess, unguided, the relative
quality [and availability of medical care].").
150. See id. at 766 ("To be fully effective, a market-driven system of quality
assurance must permit a consumer to act on the information they receive.").
Jacobi points out that "[t]he structure of the insurance system should be adjusted
to permit consumers to 'vote with their feet' by directly selecting their insurance
plans." See id.
151. See, e.g., HPO's and Physician Skills for MCO's, (visited Apr. 12, 1998i
<http//www2.umdnj.edu/gpph/ira4.html>; Physician and Service Guide of the Medi-
cal College Hospitals (visited Apr. 12, 1998) <http://www.mco.edu/hosp/apmco/>.
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B. Adversarial Approaches
Critics of the tort system observe that too few malpractice suits are
brought, for reasons that include the costs of bringing lower dollar
amount claims, the lack of return for the plaintiff lawyer on small cases
and a lack of awareness of many injured patients that they had a potential
claim for malpractice. 15 2 Patients with small claims rarely sue, so that a
substantial number of potential claims are never brought into the civil jus-
tice system. 153 The current system thus compensates far fewer patients
than actually suffer injury, at least in the hospital setting. The Harvard
Medical Practice Study
estimated that the incidence of malpractice claims filed by pa-
tients for the study year was between 2,967 and 3,888. Using
these figures, together with the projected statewide number of
injuries from medical negligence during the same period, we es-
timated that eight times as many patients suffered an injury from
negligence as filed a malpractice claim in New York State. About
16 times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as
received compensation from the tort liability system.' 54
Another study, based on a match between hospital files and litigated
actions, concluded that this estimate was too high. 155 Because many
claims filed reflect cases in which researchers found no negligent adverse
event, fewer than two percent of negligent adverse events, or less than one
in fifty, resulted in claims. 156
The flaws of the tort system have been well-described elsewhere. 157
The limits on individual malpractice suits against physicians are matched
by the limitations on suing health care institutions such as MCOs. Because
it preempts state law causes of action in many circumstances, the primary
152. See generally Sheila M. Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes Me-
diation, 52 DisP. RESOL. 42, 43-44 (1997) (discussing reasons for failure of tort
system).
153. See Furrow, supra note 144, at 77, 130 (stating there is underfiling of valid
injury claims).
154. REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (1990), in PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL IN-
JURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 6 (1993).
155. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical Analysis of Accidents and Accident Law:
The Case of Medical Malpractice Law, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 823, 847 (1992) ("[T]he
true odds of a claim following an actual negligent adverse event is much closer to
one in fifty than one in eight.").
156. See id. at 847 ("The result is that large numbers of claims followed hospi-
talizations in which our review process uncovered no injury and/or no
negligence.").
157. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 149, at 746-47 ("The medical malpractice sys-
tem, therefore, addresses very few alleged cases of medical injury compared to the
negligent injuries experienced, and, even for that small number, it does so
poorly.").
31
Furrow: Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
barrier to such suits is the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). 1 58
ERISA established uniform national standards for employee benefit
plans and broadly preempted state regulation of these plans. 15 9 Section
1144(a) states that ERISA supersedes state laws to the extent that they "re-
late to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.' 60 Congress passed
ERISA to provide for national uniform administration of employee pen-
sion and health plans, to promote the growth of private plans by freeing
them from a patchwork of state laws that complicated benefits
administration. 1
61
ERISA has been wildly successful. ERISA plans are the leading source
of payment for health services nationwide. 162 If ERISA preempts a state
law claim, then the plaintiff is relegated to section 502(a) (1) (B) of
ERISA. 1
63
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,1 64 the United
States Supreme Court held that an employee covered under his or her
employer's welfare benefit plan could not recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages for financial losses that were allegedly caused by "improper
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
159. See Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning the Effect of ERISA Pre-
emption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan Administrators, Managed
Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, HEALTH LAw., Early Spring 1996, at 3
(noting that ERISA provided national uniform administration of employee pen-
sion plans by freeing private plans from "scramble of state laws that unnecessarily
complicated employee benefit administration"); see also New York State Conf. of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1995)
("ERISA's comprehensive regulation of employee welfare and pension benefit
plans extends to those that provide 'medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits'
for plan participants or their beneficiaries 'through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise."' (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002)).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see LarryJ. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the
Health Care Industry: An Abdication ofJudicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV.
355, 375-80 (1994) (discussing effect of ERISA preemption clause). One commen-
tator noted that
[t]he Supreme Court has held that a state law will be considered to 're-
late to' an employee benefit plan, and therefore be preempted, if it has a
'connection with or reference to such a plan' unless the law has an im-
pact on ERISA plans that is 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral.'
Roth, supra note 159, at 3.
161. See Pittman, supra note 160, at 357-59 (noting that primary purpose of
ERISA is to "provide protection to employees and not employers"); Roth, supra
note 159, at 3 (discussing background and purpose of ERISA).
162. Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA HMO Malpractice & Enter-
prise Liability, 22 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (1996) ("ERISA-governed plans now cover
more that one-half of all American workers.").
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (stating that civil action may be brought
"by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan .... ); see also Pittman, supra note 160,
at 430-31 & n.487 (discussing employee and beneficiary recovery under ERISA).
164. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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or untimely" processing of the employee's claim for disability benefits.
165
Section 409(a)'s statement that the fiduciary "shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate"
precludes compensatory and punitive damages to compensate benefi-
ciaries for personal injuries. 166 Although a beneficiary can sue a benefit
plan or benefit plan manager or other fiduciary, a beneficiary cannot col-
lect any personal compensatory or punitive damages under section
409(a). 167 ERISA therefore substantially restricts the amount of recovery
possible in what would otherwise be an ordinary malpractice case. 168 ER-
ISA allows a defendant to remove an ordinary malpractice case to federal
court and invoke ERISA preemption to end the traditional lawsuit and
require its reframing as a breach of ERISA.169 The plaintiff's potential
damage award is severely curtailed as a result.
ERISA was interpreted by the federal courts in the first wave of litiga-
tion as totally preempting common law tort claims. 170 Apparently, any
managed care plan that was ERISA-qualified would receive virtually com-
plete tort immunity. 171 The federal courts began to split, however, as to
the limits of such preemption, and more recently, several decisions have
limited the preemption clause of ERISA, holding that many tort theories
165. Id. at 148. Respondent, a beneficiary under an ERISA plan, became dis-
abled and received benefits for several months. See id. at 136. Her benefits were
then discontinued only to be reinstated on review several months later. See id. at
136-37. Respondent sued for improper refusal to pay benefits for that period of
time. See id. The Court held that section 409(a) of ERISA does not provide a
cause of action for extracontractual damages for untimely processing of benefits.
See id. at 148.
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 (stating that "Congress
did not intend that section to authorize any relief except for the plan itself").
167. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 (finding no express authority for awarding
extracontractual damages to beneficiary).
168. See id. at 146-47 (stating that Court is "reluctant to tamper with an en-
forcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA"). The re-
sult is that a plaintiff is limited to the remedies that ERISA expressly provides. See
id. at 147 (noting Court's further reluctance to read other remedies into statute).
169. See Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.N.J. 1994) (agreeing with dis-
trict court's decision to grant motion to remove medical malpractice claim to fed-
eral court because "plaintiff's claims 'related to' an employee benefit plan as that
term is defined by ERISA").
170. See, e.g., id. at 129-30 (concurring with reasoning adopted by other courts
that ERISA preempts state law tort claims); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F.
Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claims that HMO was liable
under several common law theories were preempted); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F.
Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that state tort claims were preempted by
ERISA and leaving it up to Congress to clarify scope of ERISA); Altieri v. CIGNA
Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn. 1990) (finding that ERISA
preempts plaintiff's negligent supervision claim against HMO).
171. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989)
(listing three laws that are generally preempted: (1) those that "provide an alterna-
tive cause of action to employees to collect benefits protected by ERISA;" (2) those
that refer specifically to ERISA plans and apply solely to them; and (3) those that
"interfere with the calculation of benefits owed to an employee.").
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have little or nothing to do with the administration of pension plans or
other benefits.1 72 Although the circuit courts and the Supreme Court
may continue to carve out exceptions to the general preemption of ER-
ISA, it is unlikely that Congress will act to eliminate it. Thus, one must
assume that MCOs will be largely protected against the most powerful tort
theories: corporate negligence and direct negligence for defective plan
design.
C. Regulation in the States
Over the past three years, states have begun to micromanage HMOs
by adopting a variety of laws that provide direct access to specialists, pro-
hibit gag clauses and grant physicians the right to health plan information
about their practice patterns. 173 These laws fall into four general regula-
tory categories: (1) protection of patient information, (2) limits on plan
control of physicians, (3) improvements in access to treatment, and (4)
improved physician rights vis-a-vis plans in such areas as appeal rights, con-
tracting and no-gag clauses. 174 Four states have restricted financial incen-
tives that HMOs can impose on physicians to deny medically necessary
care. 175 Some states have required that HMOs disclose financial incen-
tives to patients. 17 6 The legislation is often in response to a highly visible
politically charged set of anecdotes, such as the "drive-by" delivery, when
women are discharged from the hospital only twenty-four hours after giv-
ing birth. 177 Other restrictions are physician-protective in response to the
172. SeePrihodav. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D. Md. 1996) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt action against physicians and HMO for physicians' failure
to diagnose cancerous tumor and allowing vicarious liability action to proceed); see
also Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (con-
cluding that ERISA preempts plaintiffs direct negligence claim but not vicarious
liability claim); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 802
F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (determining that negligence claim against
HMO for selecting, retaining and evaluating plaintiff's primary-care physician was
not preempted by ERISA); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983,
988 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that ERISA does not preempt state medical malprac-
tice-type claims brought against HMOs under vicarious liability theory).
173. See Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the Laboratory of the States,
278JAMA 1102, 1103 (1997) (discussing most significant state regulatory activity in
past years).
174. See id. at 1103-07 (explaining four general regulatory techniques em-
ployed by states recently).
175. See id. at 1104 (discussing restrictions in Georgia, Maryland, Texas and
Rhode Island).
176. See id. (adding that American Medical Association called for disclosure of
financial incentives to patients in 1990).
177. See generally id. at 1104 (noting that "[s]ome commentators have sug-
gested that incentives will decrease patients' access to needed treatment"). Mary-
land, for example, has a statute empowering physicians to order up to a two-day
hospital stay following a vaginal delivery, and a four-day stay for Cesarean sections.
See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-1305.4(c) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (stating
that shorter stays may be permissible provided that review agent complies with
additional requirements such as home visits). New Jersey's statute has the same
[Vol. 43: p. 361
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anger of providers who lose patients because MCOs do not contract with
them.1 78 These "any willing provider" laws aim to preempt the power of
HMOs to create restricted lists of participating providers.17 9
State insurance regulation suffers from three major flaws. First, many
of the reforms aim at the cost-cutting strategies of MCOs without regard to
the cost efficiencies that underlie many of these strategies. The easy polit-
ical gain from some of the patient-protective provisions, such as extensions
of maternity stays in the hospital, make tempting targets for legislators.
The problem with these reforms is that they rush to reform a market that
is just developing. Second, the focus on physician incentives and loss of
autonomy in the clinical setting misses the evolution of health care that
managed care represents. The point of many of these changes is to pro-
duce a sophisticated integrated team approach to care rather than focus-
ing on the model of the virtuous and solitary physician. Constraining
experimentation as to physician incentives and workplace changes risks
slowing the reforms that are rapidly improving much of medical practice.
Third, state regulation has the classic problem of all localized regulation:
it is piecemeal and variable from state to state, requiring nationwide plans
to custom tailor their plans in each state. If reform is desirable, it is better
undertaken at the national level. The states as laboratories of experimen-
tation is a noble idea, but states are also subject to interest group lobbying
to a more powerful extent than is Congress.
minimum stays, but allows the mother as well as the treating physician, to insist on
the full two or four days. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-7.1 (West 1996) (dealing
with health insurance benefits following childbirth).
At the federal level, Senators Bradley and Kassebaum have introduced a bill
creating The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, also over-
turning MCOs' ability to set hospital stay limits. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2935; see 141 CONG. REc. S9175 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Brad-
ley) (introducing bill to require minimum hospital stay for mother and child after
childbirth); see also Art Caplan, Halting the 'OB Express' Is Tempting, But Tricky: It's
Misguided to Pass Laws Protecting Single Class of Patient, PHmA. INQUIRER, July 3, 1995,
at A9 (discussing Bradley-Kassebaum bill).
178. See Miller, supra note 173, at 1106 (noting that first generation of physi-
cian protective laws took form of any willing provider laws).
179. See id. at 1106 (finding that any willing provider laws permit physician
participation in health care plans if they meet stated criteria); see also, e.g., IND.
CODE § 27-8-11-3 (1995 & Supp. 1997) (providing that before entering agreement
insurer shall establish conditions that must be met by providers); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-22-617 (1997) (outlining preferred provider contract provisions). Any will-
ing provider laws impose a governmental limit on an MCO's ability to restrict sub-
scribers' health care provider choice. See Gary Francesconi, Note, ERISA Preemption
of "Any Willing Provider" Laws-An Essential Step Toward National Health Care Reform,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 229-31 (1995) (noting that any willing provider laws are
example of current regulation that "thwarts the growth of managed care alterna-
tives"). Francesconi noted that "[y]et, the freedom to select only a limited number
of providers is essential to the success of preferred provider organizations." Id. at
232 (emphasis added) (concluding that determination of whether ERISA
preempts any willing provider laws is critical) .
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D. Private Accreditation
The process of accrediting health care institutions has been around
since the creation of theJCAHO. 180 One commentator proposed a defini-
tion of accreditation:
Accreditation can be defined as the formal expression by a pri-
vate body of an authoritative opinion concerning the acceptabil-
ity, under objective quality standards fairly applied, of the
services rendered by a particular institutional provider.' 81
Accreditation typically articulates standards for establishing and then
measuring quality.1 82 It then evaluates organizations to determine if they
have met these standards. 183 In health care, as in education and other
social activities, private accrediting bodies replace or supplant government
regulation of the activity. 1 84 Their approval allows providers to receive
government money, to continue to train professionals and so on.185 The
Administrative Conference of the United States calls this process "audited
self-regulation."
1. Benefits of Private Accreditation
The first reason for delegating to private organizations what appears
to be an appropriate public function is that it reduces the public payroll by
moving enforcement costs off-budget, and shifts the financing of regula-
180. See generally Timothy StoltzfusJost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REv. 835,
882 (1983) [hereinafterJost, JCAHO Private Regulation] (noting that "JCAH accred-
itation also limits health care delivery to institutional settings by excluding compet-
ing non-institutional alternatives"); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (1994) [hereinafterJost, Medicare andJCAHO] (not-
ing thatJoint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
accreditation program is "oldest and most substantial regulatory use of health care
accreditation in the United States"); Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a
Substitute for Direct Government Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When Is
It Appropriate?, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 52-55, (1994) (finding thatJCAH,
now JCAHO, has been "predominant private accrediting body"); Douglas C.
Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47
ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 218-22 (1995) (noting thatJCAHO was "founded long before
the Medicare and Medicaid programs").
181. Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword: The Place of Private Accrediting Among the
Instruments of Government, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 1, 2 (1994).
182. SeeJost, Medicare andJCAIHlO, supra note 180, at 17 (describingJCAHO
revision of accreditation manuals to focus on streamlining its standards).
183. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 2 ("The central purpose [of accredita-
tion] is usually to reassure consumers and other users concerning the quality of
the industry's products or services.").
184. See id. at 3 (noting that when government has regulatory presence, pri-
vate groups hope it will "respect their standards and seals of approval").
185. See generally Michael, supra note 180, at 219 (discussing private accredit-
ing bodies).
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tion to fees paid by firms seeking accreditation. 18 6 Second, the standards
issued by the accrediting body can be more effective because the organiza-
tion can develop superior knowledge of the subject when compared with
the government agency, and self-regulation allows for more diversity in
methods of compliance with legal rules than a government agency can
provide. 187 This government reliance on private accreditation arguably
helps to "foster pluralism in the regulatory state."1 88 Third, self-regulation
may result in better compliance with rules, no matter who promulgates
them or how they are designed, because self-enforcement is more effective
and more easily accepted by the regulated entities.' 89 Finally, self-regula-
tion achieves compliance through more flexible methods than bureau-
cratic "command and control" methods. 190 This approach to regulation is
"consistent with modern regulatory reform."' 9 '
2. Limits of Private Accreditation
Critics of the private accreditation process respond to the above dis-
cussion with several critical observations of the process.' 92 First, they note
the lack of independence of private accrediting organizations.1 9 3 These
organizations charge fees and consult with the organizations that they
charge. 194 Second, the survey process is predictable. On-site inspections
186. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 7 (commenting that one explanation
for government reliance on private accrediting is reduced public payroll); see also
Michael, supra note 180, at 184 (discussing cost savings to federal government as
result of self-regulation).
187. See Michael, supra note 180, at 181-82 (explaining that accrediting body
has more technical expertise than government). JCAHO, for example, can confer
"deemed status" on hospitals. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 8-9 (discussing
constitutionality of conferring "deemed status" on hospitals). This does not raise a
constitutional issue because the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA")
retains the authority to revoke a hospital's status if it finds that the JCAHO has
failed to provide adequate evidence of compliance with federal standards. See id.
at 8 (explaining constitutionality of process). Havighurst noted that
"[c] omparable 'look-behind' authority is generally provided whenever private ac-
creditors are recognized by government." Id. at 9.
188. Havighurst, supra note 181, at 10.
189. See Michael, supra note 180, at 181 (noting that another advantage of
self-regulation is increased compliance with rules that are "tailored to the condi-
tions of the-particular industry or workplace").
190. Id. at 181.
191. Id. "Self-regulation is widely regarded by researchers as having great po-
tential to produce effective results from the sweeping mandates of modern legisla-
tion." Id. at 185.
192. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 9-14 (highlighting possible objections
to self-regulation); Michael, supranote 180, at 189 (discussing three disadvantages
of audited self-regulation).
193. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 9 (noting that "statutory definition of
independence permits governance by a self-perpetuating board of professional so-
ciety insiders, with only a small minority of board-selected 'public members"').
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of hospital and nursing homes are announced well in advance and provide
opportunities for administrators to fix problems. 195 Third, accrediting
bodies such as JCAHO have a limited ability to investigate complaints. 19
6
Interested third parties typically cannot speak confidentially with a survey
team.1 9 7 JCAHO policy requires disclosure to the health facility of the
identity of the person seeking a public information interview with a sur-
veyor, making it unlikely that staff, patients or interested members of the
public will volunteer complaints or information about actual health plan
policies and practices.198 Fourth, the private accreditation process gener-
ally lacks public accountability and access by the public to the standard
development process. 199 When HCFA or a licensing authority develops
new standards, they notify the public and provide opportunity for public
comment. Written comments are filed and available for public inspec-
tion, and the authorities explain why comments were accepted or rejected.
The standards and survey guidelines are then made available on the In-
ternet, in libraries and through government publications. NCQAJCAHO
and other private accrediting bodies have no obligation to publish pro-
posed accreditation standards, but are able to copyright and sell these
standards at high prices. Survey reports are surrounded by secrecy, with
only summaries released. Even when public authorities rely on private ac-
creditation to deem facilities in compliance with federal and state stan-
dards, public access to meaningful information about those facilities is
virtually nonexistent.20 0 Fifth, the standards often give too much discre-
tion to the organizations inspected with regard to compliance.2 0 1 Private
accrediting organizations do not evaluate how consumers move through
and between systems of care.2 0 2 Many standards provide only a minimum
195. See Havighurst, supra note 181, at 12-13 (discussing the possibility that
competition among accreditors would "encourage laxity in standards and
oversight").
196. SeeJost, JCAHO Private Regulation, supra note 180, at 876-77 (noting limi-
tations on who may speak with survey team).
197. See id. at 879 n.352 (outlining public information interview procedure).
198. See Claudia Scholsberg, National Health Law Program, Quality Oversight
and Improvement: Different Levels of Accountability, Testimony Before the Advisory Com-
mission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry (Sept. 10, 1997),
in 189 HEALTH ADvoc. 5 (1997).
199. See Kinney, supra note 180, at 67, 78 (noting that private accreditation
lacks accountability and that "[p]rivate accreditors do not have .. . formal
processes [like the notice and comment procedures under Administrative Proce-
dure Act] by which to contact consumers in a systematic fashion and to assure that
all consumers have an opportunity to influence the content of the standards").
200. SeeJost, JCAHO Private Regulation, supra note 180, at 882 (acknowledging
that JCAHO provides little useful information to public about accredited
institutions).
201. See id. at 877 ("JCAH does not require facilities to meet all or indeed any
of its requirements or standards but only to 'substantially comply' with the stan-
dards as a whole.").
202. See, e.g., id. at 877 n.334 (noting thatJCAHO handles many complaints
by asking facility to evaluate itself).
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framework and give plans enormous discretion to define the standards
and the level of compliance. 20 3 NCQA Managed Behavioral Health Care
Standards for Accreditation require plans to make timely utilization man-
agement decisions, but the health plan, and not NCQA, has discretion to
define its own timeliness standard. The most relevant indicators of good
outcomes, such as deaths or adverse drug reactions, are often not mea-
sured. Sixth, survey results sometimes fail to translate into meaningful ac-
creditation decisions. Although JCAHO, for example, does identify
problems, these problems may not translate into low scores or poor-per-
formance reports, because of the flexibility and variability in the scoring
process. Seventh, enforcement has been weak.20 4 Accreditation status
may be full, with recommendations, one year, denial or deferral. There
are no intermediate sanctions, and patterns of repeat violations rarely af-
fect accreditation status. On-site follow-ups are not required to lift defi-
ciencies in hospitals.
The actual operation of private accreditation, however, is more re-
sponsive and more complex than simple government regulation would
be.205 NCQA and JCAHO are both increasingly responding to both con-
sumer criticism and employer alliances. This purchaser orientation is in
contrast to the older view of accreditation as essentially self-regulation-a
way of avoiding real government regulation while not achieving much. A
closer look at NCQA, for example, reveals that the merits of private ac-
creditation may be substantial.
203. See id. at 878-79 ("Research has found low correlations between JCAHO
accreditation and other measures of hospital quality and wide variation in quality
between JCAHO accredited hospitals.").
204. See Jost, JCAHO Private Regulation, supra note 180, at 881 ("JCAHO is a
consultant and not an enforcer.").
205. SeeJost, Medicare andJCAHO, supra note 180, at 45 (reviewing private
accreditation process). Jost has noted that
[a]ccreditation has traditionally been identified with industry self-regula-
tion. The federal government's reliance on private accreditation for
guaranteeing the quality of Medicare participating providers has thus
been seen as suspect by those who fear that self-regulation is a poor vehi-
cle for protecting consumers. The self-regulation model is too simplistic
to explain the Joint Commission, however. The Joint Commission is re-
sponsive not only to the hospitals it accredits, but also to the physicians
who created it and still play a major role in its governance, and to the
federal and state governments whose recognition effectively gives the
Joint Commission monopoly power in the hospital accreditation business.
In the future, the Commission may also become responsive to the con-
sumer or employer alliances that will direct the purchase of health care.
Because it must respond to these various interests, the Joint Commission
is arguably better able to assure the quality of health care than would be
any simple self-regulatory body.
399
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Creating Competitive Pressures in the Marketplace
Energizing Consumers
The NCQA is an independent, nonprofit standard-setting organiza-
tion that surveys and accredits MCOs and develops performance standards
for health plan report cards.20 6 Accreditation is an indication that an
MCO is committed to principles of quality and is continuously improving
the clinical care and services provided. 20 7 NCQA reviews how a plan man-
ages its delivery system of physicians, hospitals and other providers. Its
performance measures look at specific indicators of quality and it has be-
come the leading source of quality information on MCOs. 20 8 The survey
process can lead to a denial of accreditation for an MCO, giving NCQA
and JCAHO substantial and increasing power to influence managed care
development. 209
A. Forcing Data Generation
NCQA history goes back to the Health Maintenance Organization Act
of 1973.210 It was established by HMO trade groups to forestall federal
oversight, and for years, it did very little, With no full-time staff, and no
standards against which to measure HMO performance. HMOs had little
206. See NCQA Government Page (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://
www.ncqa.org/govemment/welcome.htm> (stating that, although NCQA is not
government entity, independent, non-profit agency does interact with federal and
state governments).
207. See generally What Is MCO Accreditation? (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://
www.ncqa.org/accred.html> (explaining what NCQA evaluates when accrediting
MCOs).
208. NCQA has reviewed 333 of the nation's HMOs. See NCQA Consumer
Brochure: Choosing Quality: Finding the Health Plan That's Right for You (visited Mar.
11, 1998) <http://www.ncqa.org/consumer.htm> [hereinafter NCQA Consumer
Brochure] (offering guide of nation's HMOs for consumers). Several states, includ-
ing Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, NewJersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont and West Virginia, allow MCOs to use NCQA
accreditation to satisfy an external quality review requirement. Alabama, Iowa,
New York, Ohio and Tennessee require MCOs to obtain NCQA accreditation. See
NCQA Government Page, supra note 206 (listing states); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
641.512 (1997) (allowing accreditation by accreditation organization approved by
state department); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-429 (1996) (same); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 449.476 (1997) (same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-8-23 (1996) (discussing accreditation
standards); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-3110 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (same); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 9414 (1997) (same).
209. See MICHAEL L. MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE: DocToRs
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 341 (1997) (quoting unnamed
HMO medical director as saying, "You flunk an NCQA exam, you get a new medi-
cal director and a new CEO").
210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-14a (1994).
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incentive to seek accreditation, absent threats such as withholding Medi-
care reimbursement or employer threats to switch out of unaccredited
plans. This situation changed with the growing demands by corporate em-
ployers for accountability.21 1 Xerox was first; in 1990, Xerox demanded
that the MCOs which served its employees nationwide get NCQA accredi-
tation within five years or be ejected from the Xerox network. This em-
ployer purchasing process was accelerated further by collaboration
between Xerox and several other large employers to measure and com-
pare HMOs on quality indicators. This collaboration gave rise to the
Health Plan-Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS). HEDIS 1.0 ap-
peared in 1991, and in 1992, its development was turned over to NCQA.
By 1993, plans covering more than fifty-five million HMO members had
embraced HEDIS 2.0 and its more than sixty separate performance meas-
ures.2 12 Accreditation then became more difficult and expensive to pro-
cure. HEDIS emphasized population-based quality improvement projects
like pap smear screening or asthma outreach.
NCQA has become a tough inspector. Only forty percent of plans get
the full three-year accreditation; thirty-five percent get a one-year ap-
proval; eight percent are accredited provisionally; and eleven percent are
denied accreditation.21 3 By 1997, fifty percent of licensed HMOs were re-
viewed by NCQA and twenty-five percent were scheduled. 214 Nearly
ninety HMOs publicly reported the seventeen HEDIS measures of per-
formance, ranging from average maternity stay to member access to serv-
ices. 215 NCQA has now begun to release comparative information on the
quality of care provided by the majority of capitated systems in the United
States, covering more than thirty-seven million Americansy t 6
211. See Peter V. Lee, The Promise & Perils of Managed Health Care, Consumers
Search for a Level Playing Field, 18 WHrrrIMER L. REv. 3, 9 (noting that some larger
employers provide incentives to employees to choose NCQA accredited HMOs);
Gordon Simonds, Quality of Care Issues, at 303, 325 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7190, 1997) (noting growing list of employers
who require or request NCQA accreditation of plans). Some of the companies
that require or request NCQA accreditation surveys include Allied Signal, Amer-
itech, Bristol Myers-Squibb, Chrysler, Digital Equipment, Ford, GE, GTE, IBM,
Marriott, Mobil, NationsBank, PepsiCo, Procter & Gamble, UPS, USAir and Xerox.
See National Committee For Quality Assurance: An Overview, (visited Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.ncqa.org/overview3.htm> (listing companies).
212. See Simonds, supra note 211, at 309 (discussing NCQA's integration with
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) program).
213. See id. at 326 (displaying table of NCQA accreditation status statistics).
214. See National Committee for Quality Assurance: An Overview, supra note 211
(noting that half of HMOs in nation are currently involved in NCQA accreditation
process and "[m]ore than 75% of all Americans have been reviewed by NCQA").
215. See The State of Managed Care Quality (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www/
ncqa.org/news/report.htm> (displaying HEDIS data).
216. See id. (recognizing "unprecedented opportunity to examine and com-
pile performance across the managed care industry").
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B. Originating Quality Factors
The rising criticism of managed care, state legislative backlash and
media attention has strengthened NCQA review. HEDIS 3.0, now in ef-
fect, has seventy-one indicators in eight areas: effectiveness of care, acces-
sibility and availability of care, satisfaction with experience of care, cost of
care, stability of the health plan, informed health care choices for patients,
use of services and plan descriptive information.2 1 7 Another thirty testing
indicators are also being issued.
NCQA standards include written policies and procedures in the
credentialing process; credentialing, recredentialing, recertification and
reappointment of physicians and other licensed practitioners; visitation
and review of the offices of primary care practitioners, obstetricians, gyne-
cologists and other high-volume specialty physicians as to medical record
keeping; and review of data during the recredentialing or recertification
process involving member complaints, utilization management, quality re-
view and member satisfaction surveys.2 18 NCQA standards define quality
improvement (QI) structures and demand that accredited HMOs have QI
programs and require health management systems to improve the health
status of members with chronic conditions.2 19 The 1997 standards require
each MCO to adopt and disseminate practice guidelines for the provision
of acute and chronic care services, and annually measure its performance
against at least two guidelines. Standard Q19 addresses clinical QI activi-
ties, monitors utilization and continuity and coordination of care that
members receive. Standard Q110 requires clinical measurement activities,
using data collection, measurement and analysis to track the clinical QI
issues. Standard CR9 addresses recredentialing and requires an MCO to
incorporate the following data in its decision making: member com-
plaints, information from QI activities, utilization management, member
satisfaction, medical record interviews and site visits.
The NCQA 1997 accreditation standards include five standards on
the establishment and monitoring of clinical practice guidelines for acute
and chronic conditions. As part of this review, the MCO must demon-
strate that it has adopted clinical practice guidelines, that the guidelines
are based on reasonable medical evidence, that MCO practitioners had
substantial input into the development of the guidelines, that the MCO
reviews and updates them and that the MCO measures performance
against them.220
217. See HEDIS 3.0 Executive Summary: What Kind of Measures Are in HEDIS 3.0?(visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.ncqa.org/hedis/30exsum.htm#whatmeasures>
(noting eight performance domains for which measures were sought).
218. See generally STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZA-
TIONS (Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance 1997).
219. Id. Standard Q17.
220. See generally STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZA-
TIONS (Nat'l Comm. for Quality Assurance 1997). JCAHO has also developed man-
aged care standards, reflecting performance expectations in areas such as
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Pressure to measure quality has built up because of the perception
that the prices in many markets have been driven to such a low point that
quality might be affected. This disclosure-based regulation has three
goals: (1) accuracy enhancement, by helping consumers know enough to
select among and bargain with providers; (2) agency cost reduction, coun-
terbalancing provider and fiscal intermediary incentives to conceal con-
flicts of interest; and (3) performance improvement.22 1
Such external measures of quality provide a useful benchmark, help-
ing organizations to resist cost-cutting pressures that might show a measur-
able reduction in subscriber quality of care.2 22 The NCQA's HEDIS
program now incorporates Medicaid and Medicare performance meas-
ures, focusing on outcomes. 223 Under HEDIS data measures, MCOs are
tested on their effectiveness in caring for patients, accessibility and availa-
bility of care, enrollee satisfaction with care, costs of care, financial and
provider stability, availability of information on treatment options and
choices, use of services and descriptions of provider, clinical, utilization
and risk management activities. 224 The quality indicators in HEDIS mea-
sure selected areas to assess overall quality, such as mammography screen-
ing, cervical cancer screening, first trimester pregnancy care, prevention
of low birth weight, pediatric immunizations, cholesterol screening rates,
in-patient admission rates for asthma patients, a diabetic retinal exam and
ambulatory follow-up after hospitalization for major affective disorders.2 25
Defining and measuring quality from the consumer's perspective can
be difficult.2 2 6 And the limited value of plan-wide data to the consumer is
an additional problem. Consumers are often limited in their choice of
plan and are "more interested in information about specific physicians,
groups of physicians, or specific hospitals than health plans."227 Nonethe-
less, invidious comparisons by employers searching for the best plans for
preventive care, continuation of care, management of doctors, nurses and staff;
patient rights; and procedures for measuring and improving the quality of patient
care. See JCAHO, Joint Commission Standards (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http://
www.jcaho.org/prefmeas/stds.htm> (discussing JCAHO's "broad spectrum" of
standards).
221. See William M. Sage & Dave Anderson, Health Care Disclosure Requirements,
in HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK 185, 186 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995) ("Mandating that
a managed care organization measure and report a process or outcome is a clear
signal to devote attention to the activity being tested.").
222. See generally HEDIS 3.0 Executive Summary (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http//
www.ncqa.org/hedis/30exsum.htm#whatis> (explaining that HEDIS will allow de-
cisions to be made based on overall value and not only cost).
223. See id. (stating private and public section measurement efforts are
brought together).
224. See HEDIS 3.0 Reporting and Testing Set Measures (visited Mar. 12, 1998)
<http://www.ncqa.org/news/hedismeas.htm> (listing quality indicators).
225. See NCQA Consumer Brochure, supra note 208 (offering guide of nation's
HMOs for consumers).
226. See Paul D. Cleary & Susan Edgman Levitan, Health Care Qualtiy: Incorpo-
rating Consumer Perspectives, 278 JAMA 1608, 1608-09 (1997).
227. Id. at 1609.
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their employees will still create pressure on MCOs to meet the level of
performance of the better plans.
C. Ranking HMOs
A 1997 report by NCQA, based on 333 HMOs, covering forty-five mil-
lion Americans representing seventy-five percent of HMO enrollees,
found substantial variation among HMOs on several indicators.228 The
study looked at HEDIS data, including measures such as advising smokers
to quit, beta blocker treatment, breast cancer screening, cervical cancer
screening, cesarean section rates, childhood immunizations, diabetic eye
exams and prenatal care in the first trimester. The study found, for exam-
ple, that heart attack patients in one region were treated with beta block-
ers less than twenty percent of the time in some health plans, but more
than ninety percent of patients receive beta blocker treatment in the best
performing plans. 2 29 Similar variations were found for the other
indicators.
These comparisons of individual HMOs are now available by tele-
phone and on the Internet for consumers to examine, as are news maga-
zine rankings. No organization wants to be on the bottom, or below
average, in any comparison.
D. Creating Competitive Pressures in the Marketplace
Comparative data as to outcomes and success rates in hospitals and
particular medical specialties is proliferating. Information gathering by
health care institutions is beginning to produce disclosure of comparative
success rates and outcome data when available, particularly under pres-
sure from corporate purchasers of health care who want good results for
their employees. And it is about time. As long ago as 1913, Ernest Amory
Codman, the medical pioneer of outcome studies, argued that institutions
and surgeons should disclose their successes and failures so that the public
could choose the best provider.2 30 Progress has been slow in the face of
medical resistance.
The production of such plan-specific comparative data allows pur-
chasers of health care, both private and public, to shop for performance as
well as the lowest price. HEDIS data is also increasingly used by news me-
dia, such as U.S. News and World Report, and by corporate groups and states
228. See NCQA Consumer Brochure, supra note 208 (offering guide of nation's
HMOs for consumers).
229. See id. (stating that NCQA report focuses on eight HEDIS measures,
although data for more than 50 HEDIS measures is available).
230. See Gary S. Belkin, The Technocratic Wish: Making Sense and Finding Power
in the "Managed Medical Marketplace", 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 509, 523-24
(1997) (discussing Codman's ideology).
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producing report cards.23 1 One commentator noted that "It] he challenge
is to take the information and use it to reward plans that demonstrate high
quality and improvement over time. Through these efforts consumers and
purchasers will receive greater value for their health care dollar."23 2 Pub-
lic release of consumer reports will not only help consumers, but will also
create incentives for providers to respond to bad grades.
E. Energizing Consumers
In a market economy, information is king. Even though the health
care economy does not approximate a free market, readily accessible in-
formation on quality of care helps corporate purchasers and individual
subscribers to choose appropriately. If consumers have information about
comparative outcomes of care, they may be able to evaluate the quality of
that care. Comparative information about patient satisfaction with health
care institutions allows them to choose without having to explore the un-
derlying process of health care. Some form of report card will produce
quality through shifts in consumer demand induced by the data.
One commentator has delineated the limitations of a report card.23 3
First, such cards are hard to implement, in light of data collection and
aggregation. 23 4 The size of the plan is a major determinant of the signifi-
cance of the data. Second, the collection of meaningful outcome data is
difficult, because the quality of life and other indicators, short of mortality,
are hard to measure and define. Third, the quality of the data at present
is "often incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate."235 Fourth, it is difficult
to adjust for parent characteristics and other variables. Risk data can be
manipulated by providers toinflate their performance. Even with perfect
data, random variation will present some providers as below average.
Fifth, uniformity of reporting systems is difficult to achieve at present,
means of auditing the performance data to deter its manipulation by prov-
iders is needed and data may not be timely, but rather based on the activi-
ties of providers who have left a system. Sixth, consumers may face
information overload if too many quality measures are presented,
although consumer theorists argue that consumers typically employ a sim-
231. See Joseph W. Thompson et al., The NCQA's Quality Compass: Evaluating
Managed Care in the United States, 17 HEALTH AFF. 152, 157 (1998) (stating that
popular magazines and newspapers use HEDIS data to inform readers).
232. Id. at 157-58.
233. SeeJason Ross Penzer, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psy-
chology Marketing and the Law of Information Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health
Care Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 221-23 (1995) (noting several limitations of
performance report cards).
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pie strategy that focuses on one or two attributes of choice to eliminate
most plans.236
The advantages of such information are twofold: corporate purchas-
ers of care demand more and more of this information as part of their
choice of the best plans for their employees and individuals can at least
look at some factors that may be relevant to their decision making. More
important is the relentless pressure created by these two classes of consum-
ers on MCOs. As NCQA continues to develop and expand the classes of
information in HEDIS so that more and more clinical performance indica-
tors are listed, MCOs are forced to hire epidemiologists, statisticians and
others to gather data and interpret it for their physicians in an unrelenting
process of continuous QI. Even if the data is flawed and the comparisons
lack complete relevance, the technologies of data collection and perform-
ance measurement will evolve more rapidly under pressure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Managed care bureaucracies necessarily emphasize technical per-
formance. When a bureaucracy "presses for excellence, it tends to opt for
its most technical and measurable forms."23 7 This applies not only to the
evolution of MCOs, but also to the private accreditation process in NCQA
and the development of HEDIS 3.0. Managed care standards are moving
toward high performance combined with affordable outcomes. 23 8 A sys-
tem ethos, increasingly driven by the demands of private accreditation,
may well be reoriented away from an obsession only with cost savings and
toward quality in managed care performance.
A primary focus on health care quality and outcomes ensures that a
health care system will produce the best results that the system's level of
resources allows. A new model of provider ethics, based on good out-
comes and high quality, therefore can create the impetus for an improved
health care system. Perhaps Evans is wrong; perhaps the pressure of pri-
236. See id. at 223 ("More information in the form of raw data, statistics, and
rates may not lead to quality-based decision-making on the part of consumers.").
237. Thompson et al., supra note 231, at 181.
238. See generally Lester Carl Thurow, Sounding Board: Learning to Say "No",
311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1569, 1571 (1984). Lester Thurow stated that
[i]t will be far better if American doctors begin to build up a social ethic
and behavioral practices that help them decide when medicine is bad
medicine-not simply because it has absolutely no payoff or because it
hurts the patient-but also because the costs are not justified by the mar-
ginal benefits. To do this we are going to have to develop and dissemi-
nate better information on the cost effectiveness of alternative medical
techniques for treating different ailments ....
The medical professional now has professional norms concerning
what constitutes bad medical practice. These norms have to be expanded
to include cases in which high costs are not justified by minor expected
benefits.
[Vol. 43: p. 361
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/2
1998] REGULATING THE MANAGED CARE REVOLUTION 407
vate accreditation can help achieve public objectives of high quality yet
cost-effective health care. 239
239. For a discussion of Evans' viewpoint, see supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
47
Furrow: Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43: p. 361
48
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss2/2
